






UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS 












Coalitions in political process to promote 
bioenergy: the cases of carbon tax in Sweden 






Coalizões no processo político para promover 
bioenergia: os casos do imposto de carbono na 










CECÍLIA HIGA GONZALES MORILLA 
 
 
Coalitions in political process to promote 
bioenergy: the cases of carbon tax in Sweden 
and the RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
Coalizões no processo político para promover 
bioenergia: os casos do imposto de carbono na 






























Thesis presented to the School of 
Mechanical Engineering of the University 
of Campinas in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor in 
Energy System Planning.  
     
  
Tese apresentada à Faculdade de 
Engenharia Mecânica da Universidade 
Estadual de Campinas como parte dos 
requisitos exigidos para a obtenção do 
título de Doutora em Planejamento de 
Sistemas Energéticos. 
ESTE EXEMPLAR CORRESPONDE À VERSÃO 
FINAL DA TESE DEFENDIDA PELA ALUNA 
CECÍLIA HIGA GONZALES MORILLA, E 
ORIENTADA PELO PROF. DR MARCELO PEREIRA 
DA CUNHA.  







UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS 
FACULDADE DE ENGENHARIA MECÂNICA 
COMISSÃO DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM  
PLANEJAMENTO DE SISTEMAS ENERGÉTICOS 
 
TESE DE DOUTORADO ACADÊMICO 
 
Coalitions in political process to promote 
bioenergy: the cases of carbon tax in Sweden 
and the RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
Coalizões no processo político para promover 
bioenergia: os casos do imposto de carbono na 
Suécia e o RenovaBio no Brasil  
 
Autor: Cecília Higa Gonzales Morilla 
Orientador: Marcelo Pereira da Cunha  
A Banca Examinadora composta pelos membros abaixo aprovou esta tese:  
Prof. Dr. Marcelo Pereira da Cunha, Presidente 
Instituto de Economia/Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) 
 
Prof. Dr. João Paulo Cândia Veiga 
Departamento de Ciência Política da Faculdade de Filosofia Letras e Ciências Humanas 
da Universidade de São Paulo (FFLCH/USP) 
 
Prof. Dr. Arnaldo Cesar da Silva Walter 
Departamento de Energia da Faculdade de Engenharia Mecânica da Universidade 
Estadual de Campinas (FEM/UNICAMP) 
 
Dr. Manoel Regis Lima Verde Leal 
Centro Nacional de Pesquisa em Energia e Materiais (CNPEM) 
 
Prof. Dr. Pedro Feliú Ribeiro 
Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo (IRI/USP) 
A Ata da defesa com as respectivas assinaturas dos membros encontra-se no SIGA/Sistema 
de Fluxo de Dissertação/Tese e na Secretaria do Programa de Planejamento de Sistemas 
Energéticos da Faculdade de Engenharia Mecânica.     
   
 
Campinas, 20 de setembro de 2019 
 
I’m sorry, but I don’t want to be an emperor. That’s not my business. I don’t want to 
rule or conquer anyone. I should like to help everyone - if possible - Jew, Gentile - black man 
- white. We all want to help one another. Human beings are like that. We want to live by each 
other’s happiness - not by each other’s misery. We don’t want to hate and despise one 
another. In this world there is room for everyone. And the good earth is rich and can provide 
for everyone. The way of life can be free and beautiful, but we have lost the way. 
Greed has poisoned men’s souls, has barricaded the world with hate, has goose-
stepped us into misery and bloodshed. We have developed speed, but we have shut ourselves 
in. Machinery that gives abundance has left us in want. Our knowledge has made us cynical. 
Our cleverness, hard and unkind. We think too much and feel too little. More than machinery 
we need humanity. More than cleverness we need kindness and gentleness. Without these 
qualities, life will be violent and all will be lost…. 
The aeroplane and the radio have brought us closer together. The very nature of these 
inventions cries out for the goodness in men - cries out for universal brotherhood - for the 
unity of us all. Even now my voice is reaching millions throughout the world - millions of 
despairing men, women, and little children - victims of a system that makes men torture and 
imprison innocent people. 
To those who can hear me, I say - do not despair. The misery that is now upon us is 
but the passing of greed - the bitterness of men who fear the way of human progress. The hate 
of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the 
people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish. ….. 
Soldiers! don’t give yourselves to brutes - men who despise you - enslave you - who 
regiment your lives - tell you what to do - what to think and what to feel! Who drill you - diet 
you - treat you like cattle, use you as cannon fodder. Don’t give yourselves to these unnatural 
men - machine men with machine minds and machine hearts! You are not machines! You are 
not cattle! You are men! You have the love of humanity in your hearts! You don’t hate! Only 
the unloved hate - the unloved and the unnatural! Soldiers! Don’t fight for slavery! Fight for 
liberty! 
In the 17th Chapter of St Luke it is written: “the Kingdom of God is within man” - not 
one man nor a group of men, but in all men! In you! You, the people have the power - the 
power to create machines. The power to create happiness! You, the people, have the power to 
make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure. 
Then - in the name of democracy - let us use that power - let us all unite. Let us fight 
for a new world - a decent world that will give men a chance to work - that will give youth a 
future and old age a security. By the promise of these things, brutes have risen to power. But 
they lie! They do not fulfil that promise. They never will! 
Dictators free themselves but they enslave the people! Now let us fight to fulfil that 
promise! Let us fight to free the world - to do away with national barriers - to do away with 
greed, with hate and intolerance. Let us fight for a world of reason, a world where science 
and progress will lead to all men’s happiness. Soldiers! in the name of democracy, let us all 
unite! 
 




I dedicate this work to the people I helped during my volunteer job at the Red Cross in 
the slums in the city of São Paulo, although it feels as though they have helped me a great deal 
more than I have ever done for them. 
I dedicate this thesis to them, wishing the world could be a happier, brighter and more 
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O objetivo desse estudo multidisciplinar é a análise da elaboração de políticas públicas na área 
de bioenergia, considerando um país desenvolvido no qual a agenda ambiental está estabelecida 
e outro em desenvolvimento, em que a agenda ambiental tem de ser conciliada com o processo 
de desenvolvimento do próprio país. O foco é a compreensão das forças motivadoras que 
levaram à adoção do imposto de carbono na Suécia em relação ao setor de aquecimento e ao 
programa RenovaBio no Brasil. Assim como, o entendimento da dinâmica das interações 
ocorridas entre os atores políticos que culminaram na adoção dessas políticas, oferecendo 
interessantes percepções sobre o processo de formação de coalizões relacionado a esses estudos 
de caso. Uma breve análise de transparência também constitui objetivo desse estudo. O método 
utilizado foi a tipologia de atores em negociações bilaterais, explorando o papel dos atores 
políticos de acordo com uma distribuição funcional numa coalizão. Os resultados mostraram a 
relevância da variável econômica nas forças motivadoras identificadas para ambos os casos. 
Além disso, duas coalizões foram identificadas para cada um dos casos – uma coalizão de apoio 
e outra de oposição. A relevância da opinião pública e a participação da sociedade no processo 
político foram notáveis no caso sueco. Diferentemente do programa RenovaBio, no qual a 
opinião pública não foi considerada relevante, sendo caracterizado por um grupo minoritário 
encarregado de desenvolvê-lo no Brasil. A importância das questões de mercado influenciando 
os atores políticos a favor (ou não) de uma política e a presença de sólidos lobbies políticos 
foram evidentes para ambos os casos. Dessa forma, apesar dos fatores divergentes, alguns 
importantes pontos convergentes foram identificados nessa comparação descritiva entre um 
país desenvolvido e outro em desenvolvimento, mesmo considerando os diversos contextos, 
desenhos institucionais e períodos de análise.  














The aim of this multidisciplinary study is to analyze the policy-making processes regarding 
public policies inherent to the bioenergy field for both a developed country in which the 
environmental agenda is already established and a developing nation that is still struggling to 
balance the environmental agenda with its own development issues. The focus is the 
comprehension of the driving forces leading to the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax within 
the heating sector in Sweden and the RenovaBio in Brazil plus the understanding of interaction 
dynamics among the policy actors that led to the adoption of these policies, offering insights 
into a coalition formation process. A brief analysis has been also carried out. The framework 
utilized is the typology of actors in bilateral negotiations exploring the roles of policy actors 
according to functional distribution within a coalition. The results showed the importance of 
the economical variable within the driving forces identified for both a developed and a 
developing country. Two coalitions were identified for each one of the cases – a supporting and 
an opposing one. The influence of the public opinion and the active participation of society in 
the policy-making process were noticeable in the Swedish case. The public opinion was not as 
important for the adoption of RenovaBio which was characterized by a minority group in charge 
of developing this program in Brazil. The importance of market issues for the policy actors in 
favor (or not) of a new policy and political lobby activities were evident for both cases. 
Therefore, despite many factors identified, there were some important convergent points in this 
descriptive comparison among a developed and a developing country even when considering 
the different contexts, institutional designs and time of analysis.  


















ABBI - Brazilian Association of Industrial Biotechnology (Associação Brasileira de 
Biotecnologia Industrial) 
ABBM - Brazilian Association of Biogas and Methane (Associação Brasileira de Biogás e 
Metano) 
ABIOVE - Brazilian Association of Vegetal Oil Industries (Associação Brasileira da 
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ANFAVEA - National Association of Automotive Vehicle Manufacturers (Associação 
Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores) 
ANP - National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels 
APROBIO - Association of Biofuel Producers in Brazil (Associação dos Produtores de 
Biocombustível no Brasil) 
BRASILCOM - Association of Fuel Distributor (Associação das Distribuidoras de 
Combustíveis) 
CBIO - Emissions Reduction Certificates 
CHP - Combined Heat and Power Plant 
CNPE - National Council for Energy Policy (Conselho Nacional de Política Energética) 
COP - Conference of the Parties  
COP 3 - Third Session of the Conference of Parts  
COP 21 - Twenty-one Session of the Conference of Parts  
CSD - Commission on Sustainable Development 
CTBE - Bioethanol Science and Technology Center (Laboratório Nacional de Ciência e 
Tecnologia do Bioetanol) 
DH - District Heating 
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EMBRAPA - Agriculture Researches Brazilian Company (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa 
Agropecuária) 
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EU - European Union 
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GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GHG - Greenhouse Gas  
ICSU - International Council of Scientific Unions 
INDC - Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LCA - Life Cycle Assessment 
LO - Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige) 
LRF - Federation of Swedish Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund) 
MME - Ministry of Mining and Energy (Ministério de Minas e Energia) 
NDCs - Nationally Determined Contributions  
NGOs - Non-Governmental Organizations 
PSOL - Socialist and Liberty Party (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade) 
RD&I - Research, Development and Innovation 
REDE - Network Sustainability Party (Partido Rede Sustentabilidade) 
SFS - Swedish Code of Status 
SI - Federation of Swedish Industries (Svenska Industriefoerbundet) 
SKGS - Swedish Energy Intensive Industry (Skogen, Kemin, Gruvorna och Stålet) 
SNF- Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Svenska Naturskyddsföreningen)  
SOU - State Public Reports (Statens Offentliga Utredningar)  
STORA- Stora Kopparberg Bergslags Aktiebolag 
SVEBIO - Swedish Bioenergy Association (Svenska Bioenergiföreningens) 
TPES - Total Primary Energy Supply 
UBRABIO - Brazilian Union of Biodiesel and Biokerosene (União Brasileira do biodiesel e 
bioquerosene) 
UDOP - Union of Bioenergy Producers (União Nacional da Bioenergia) 
UN - United Nations 
UNCED - United Nations Conference on Environment and Development  
UNCHE - United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme  
UNICA - Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (União da Indústria de cana-de-açúcar) 
WCP - World Climate Program 
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“I believe that education is the single most important civil rights issue that we face today. 
Because in the end, if we really want to solve issues like mass incarceration, poverty, racial 
profiling, voting rights, and the kinds of challenges that shocked so many of us over the past 
year, then we simply cannot afford to lose out on the potential of even one young person. We 
cannot allow even one more young person to fall through the cracks.” 
(Michele Obama)  
 
 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) was held in 
1972 in Stockholm (Sweden) being the first conference addressing environmental issues 
(UNFCCC, 2006). Since then, developed nations have not been supporting the creation of a 
costly organization that would handle such vital issues (CHAMBERS, 2008). Regardless of 
that, the UNCHE set up the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as an 
environmental awareness body of the United Nations (UN) (UNEP, 2019). 
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
took place in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) (UNFCC, 2006). However, the UNEP´s political position 
had been discredited. For the developing countries, UNEP overemphasized the “green northern 
agenda1” in comparison with the “brown-on-the-ground2” agenda. Afterwards, the developing 
countries established new treaties on desertification but not under UNEP’s coordination. At that 
time, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also addressed issues related to 
environmental safety and economic development balance through global forums (e.g. in the 
Bretton Woods Institutions). Furthermore, the developing countries started to consider green 
policies from the North as possible hidden protectionist measures (CHAMBERS, 2008).     
 In 1997, the adoption of the Kyoto protocol occurred during the third Conference of 
Parts (COP 3) held in Kyoto (Japan). It was one of the most important international agreements 
to decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through which greater responsibility was 
attributed to developed nations. As a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity these 
nations were considered the main responsible ones for the higher levels of global GHG 
                                                
1 The “green on the northern agenda” comprised climate change and biodiversity issues and was linked to demands 
of the developed countries (CHAMBERS, 2008). 
2 The “brown on the ground agenda” considered air pollution and clean water issues and was connected to the 
demands of underdeveloped countries (CHAMBERS, 2008).	
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emissions. Thus, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was adopted and 
the developed countries (Annex I) had to reduce five percent of their GHG emissions taking 
1990 as the base-year for the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC, 1997, 
2014, 2016; HANSSON, 2015).  
Regarding the outcome of the Kyoto Protocol, Sweden surpassed its national target due 
to efficient public policies on transportation, industry and agriculture, among other sectors 
(HANSSON, 2015; HAITA, 2012; IEA, 2016; UNFCCC, 1997, 2016). The country is 
characterized by a low population, a moderate economic growth and a national agenda that 
contemplates environmental issues and sustainable development. In addition to that, the 
relevance of environmental issues is also connected to the regional economic and 
environmental interdependency (e.g. Nordic cooperation) (IAEA, 2009).  
Besides its own environmental awareness, the country has been a member of the 
European Union (EU) since 1995. The EU is characterized by having made serious 
commitments towards environmental awareness issues (OECD, 2001). As for the Swedish 
climate policy, the carbon dioxide tax is a cornerstone on which public dialogue and social 
deliberations were fundamental (FUNKE and MATTAUCH, 2018). The tax was created before 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1991 and was considered innovative having the support from the public 
opinion (JAGERS and HAMMAR 2009). It was levied on fossil fuels for transportation and 
heating purposes with the aim of reducing CO2 emissions (NATURVÅRDSVERKET, 2017; 
PMR, 2017). However, the effect of taxation on the heating sector led to a sharp reduction in 
heating related fossil fuels whereas a fossil-fuel free transportation system still remains a 
challenge to be dealt with (SWEDEN, 2018). 
Subsequently, through the twenty-one Conference of Parties (COP 21) the Paris 
Agreement was entered into in order to tackle climate change mitigation with a view to limit 
warming to no more than 2o C above pre-industrial levels. Each country efforts to reduce 
domestic emissions were exposed by Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (UNFCCC, 
2015; 2016). According to the Brazilian commitment, the country should reduce its emission 
by 37% below 2005 levels, by 2015. Currently, the country is characterised by an economic 
growth that led to expansion in agriculture and infrastructure. This expansion led to a higher 
energy utilization, increasing the environmental burden. Within this context, a better integrated 
environmental target for the economic and policy sectors would contribute to a greener and 
more sustainable development approaches in Brazil (OECD, 2015). 
Accordingly, the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) developed the National 
Biofuels Policy (RenovaBio) to encourage the use of bioenergy in Brazil. This program is 
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important because it follows a perspective through which the climate change and GHG 
emissions have been taken into account in order to develop an energy policy (BRASIL, 2017). 
The two above-mentioned policies concerning Swedish carbon dioxide tax and RenovaBio, 
respectively, are examples of how the environmental agenda set up on the international level 
can directly and indirectly influence domestic policies at local levels for both developed and 
developing countries.  
In the light of the foregoing and considering environmental and climate issues, this 
thesis analyses two bioenergy policies, using as reference a developed and a developing 
country. The first analysis is the Swedish carbon dioxide tax and it focuses on the heating sector. 
The second analysis refers to RenovaBio in Brazil. Therefore, this multidisciplinary study is a 
descriptive comparison between a developed country in which the environmental agenda is 
already regarded as fundamental and a developing nation that is still struggling towards 
combining development with its environmental agenda and energy policies. It is worth 
mentioning that this is not an absolutely rigorous comparative analysis since the cases in 
question are temporarily, institutionally and contextually diverse.  
 
Thus, the question over this study is:  
 
How did the policy-making processes of the Swedish carbon dioxide tax focusing on 
the heating sector and the RenovaBio in Brazil take place from planning to adoption? 
 
Taking into account the heuristic model for explaining policy-making process, the (i) 
problem identification3 and definition is the first stage, followed by (ii) agenda setting4, (iii) 
policy formulation5, (iv) policy legitimation6, (v) policy implementation7, and (vi) policy 
evaluation8, as shown in Figure 1.1 below.  
 
                                                
3 Problem identification and definition is the recognition of an existing problem (RINFRET et al., 2018). 
4 Agenda setting refers to the inclusion of a problem in the policymaker agenda (RINFRET et al., 2018). 
5 Policy formulation is characterized by the design of a policy taking shape (RINFRET et al., 2018). 
6 Policy legitimation is the process in which a bill becomes a law (RINFRET et al., 2018). 
7 Policy implementation is the deployment of the law after its enforcement (RINFRET et al., 2018). 





Figure 1.1. The policymaking process (adapted from: RINFRET et al., 2018). 
 
 
In this study the analysis contemplates (i) problem identification and definition, (ii) 
agenda setting, (iii) policy formulation, and (iv) policy legitimation. To streamline the analysis, 
these stages are mentioned as planning, formulation, and adoption of public policy referring to 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), respectively. As for the research design and methodology, the 
characterization of the policy actors’ profiles that can be performed through some parameters 
were considered. In particular, the roles connected to the distribution of functions in a coalition 
have been considered in this thesis. Thus, the framework used is the typology of actors in 
bilateral negotiations in order to analyse the joint actions of a coalition working in concert to 
achieve established goals.   
 
Therefore, the objectives of this study are:  
 
• Analyse the policy processes that led to planning, formulation, and adoption of 
the carbon dioxide tax for the Swedish heating sector; 
• Analyse the policy processes that led to planning, formulation, and adoption of 
RenovaBio in Brazil; 
• Brief analysis over the transparency of public policies in a developed as well as 
in a developing country. 
 
Accordingly, it is worth mentioning the following:    
 
• The understanding of the driving forces that led to the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax for the Swedish heating sector;  
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• The understanding of the driving forces that led to the adoption of RenovaBio in 
Brazil; 
• The understanding of the dynamics of interactions among the policy actors that 
encouraged the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax for the Swedish heating 
sector, offering insights into a coalition formation process;  
• The understanding of dynamics of interactions among the policy actors that 
eventually encouraged the adoption of the RenovaBio in Brazil, offering insights 
into a coalition formation process. 
 
Taking into account the analysis of the driving forces, the hypothesis for this study is: 
 
H1: The environmental agenda is the main driving force for developed and developing countries 
when adopting energy policies. 
 
This study is important for policy-makers, decision-makers, and stakeholders willing to 
decarbonize the energy matrices of their countries through increasing bioenergy use in 
developed and developing countries. The analysis over the policy-making processes can reveal 
significant outcomes. Furthermore, the analysis of the driving forces for a developed and a 
developing country can explore the real importance of the environmental driver for both 
scenarios. Also, understanding the dynamics of interactions among the policy actors that led to 
the adoption of these policies is important because such dynamics can be applied to previous 
or former policies thus allowing them to be considered in other contexts. The same is applicable 
to the understanding of the roles according to a functional distribution within a coalition. 
Finally, a transparency analysis is fundamental for both Swedish and Brazilian societies as they 
are truly impacted by the energy policies analysed and their related outcomes. Nevertheless, 
the understanding of the whole policy-making process is also vital for these societies for the 
same reasons.  










2 CLIMATE CHANGE BACKGROUND AND CASES DESCRIPTION 
 
 
“Never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was legal” 
(Martin Luther King) 
 
 
2.1 Initial Considerations  
 
 
In this descriptive chapter, the background on climate change issues and the important 
conferences thereof are explored under section 2.2. The first case description is presented in 
section 2.3. Background information on the carbon dioxide tax for the Swedish heating sector 
is initially explored under subsection 2.3.1. Subsequently, the energy taxation system and 
policymaking process regarding the implementation of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden is 
presented. Afterwards, the forestry sector is explored followed by the institutional design and 
the Swedish law-making process. Thereafter, the influence of institutional culture focusing on 
the forestry sector in Sweden and public approval of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden are 
addressed. Finally, the description and effects of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the heating 
sector is presented. The second case presented is the RenovaBio in Brazil under the section 2.4. 
Then, the background on this program is explored. Subsequently the policymaking process for 
the adoption of RenovaBio in Brazil is presented. After that, the bioenergy sector in Brazil is 
explored followed by the institutional design in Brazil and the Brazilian law-making process. 
Thereafter, the influence of institutional culture focusing on the bioenergy sector in Brazil is 
addressed. Finally, the description of RenovaBio in Brazil closes this Chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Background of the climate change issues and important conferences 
 
 
The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon responsible for the maintenance of all 
living beings through a perfect balance between entry and exit of sun energy. The balance from 
the radiation absorbed for the planet surface and the atmosphere occurs in the troposphere. This 
is the highest layer of the atmosphere which borders the mesosphere where the infrared 
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radiation leaves. The trapping of this radiation by natural gases from the atmosphere is 
responsible for maintaining the proper temperature for supporting life within the terrestrial 
system (IPCC, 1994).  
The unbalance in trace gases concentrations in the atmosphere generates an increase in 
temperature which is referred to as global warming. Climate changes have been linked to 
gradual and slow cycles from 50 to 100 years. However, evidences link the accelerated 
characteristics of the global warming phenomenon to the release of GHG in the atmosphere due 
to the excess of CO2 released in the atmosphere through fossil fuels burning, destruction of 
forests and use of fertilizers, among other actions (IPCC, 1994; LEAHY, 2004).  
The excessive GHG emissions in the atmosphere promotes a gas layer formation. This 
layer allows the ultraviolet rays entry but prevents the heat radiation generated by sunlight from 
entering the atmosphere. This phenomenon is transforming the Earth in a big greenhouse. The 
main consequence is the global warming which has an influence on the alteration of ecosystems. 
It also impacts the bio-geochemical cycles, mainly in water and carbon cycles. The most 
important GHG are: water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), ozone (O3), carbon monoxide (CO) and chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC) (IPCC, 1994; LIMA et al., 1999).  
In the 1980s, evidences connecting GHG emissions caused by anthropogenic activities 
and linked to global warming started to be noticed by the population as a whole. Prior to that, 
in 1972, the UNCHE was the first conference held on international environmental issues and it 
was very important because such matters reached such dimensions that it started to be discussed 
on a political level. The conference was organized by the UN and took place in Stockholm 
(Sweden) (UNFCC, 2006).  
However, some issues concerning coordination over the creation of a new agency were 
discussed at that conference. The existing UN agencies in charge of environmental issues were 
apprehensive in case they were rendered subservient or even made redundant by the creation 
of a new agency. And the developed countries presented strong resistance against creating new 
and costly organizations for handling environmental issues at that time (CHAMBERS, 2008). 
Indeed, the climate change and environmental issues were regarded as urgent matters in 
1979 at the First World Climate Conference. At that time, there was the establishment of a 
World Climate Program (WCP) under the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the 
UNEP and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) (UNFCC, 2006). Later on in 
1988 the United Nations General Assembly considered climate change as a common concern 
of humanity at the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere. Afterwards, the 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established and the First Assessment 
Report was disclosed in 1990 (UNFCC, 2006). 
This report was the main basis for negotiations at the United Nations General Assembly 
on a climate change convention held by policymakers, still in 1990 (UNFCC, 2006). In 1992, 
a general discussion over environmental factors resulted in an important outcome at the 
UNCED. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities emerged and the 
developed countries were held responsible for the substantial rise in levels of GHG emissions. 
Then, a higher level of emissions was allowed for developing countries in order for them to 
achieve the conditions of developed countries as mutual cooperation among countries should 
be on an equal basis (UN, 1992).     
Analogously to the UNCHE, the UNCED also presented issues of coordination since 
the UNEP’s coordinating role on environmental governance was being discredited by other 
governments. The UNEP was overemphasizing the interests of developed countries in 
comparison with the concerns of developing countries. The “green northern agenda” 
represented the interests of developing countries whereas the “brown-on-the-ground” agenda 
followed the interests of developing nations. The first one addressed climate change issues and 
biodiversity and the second one matters concerning air pollution and water, among others, as 
referred to in the introduction (CHAMBERS, 2008).   
Therefore, since the UNEP’s political position was declining and the agenda of 
developing countries was not being considered relevant, these countries followed new paths. 
They pursued new agreements on desertification and climate change at the UNCED. Besides 
that, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was created under the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs also with the aim of meeting the demands of 
developing countries at that conference (CHAMBERS, 2008).  
In 1995, the first Conference of the Parties (COP) was held in Berlin. In the following 
year, the human influence on global climate was perceived as evident also presenting risks for 
human and economic development according to the Second Assessment Report by IPCC. This 
report influenced the COP 3 that took place in Kyoto (Japan) in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol 
was adopted. This Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005 (UNFCC, 2006). 
Since then, several conferences were held and in 2015 the COP 21 occurred in Paris 
(France), having the drawing of the Paris Agreement as the main outcome. Pursuant to this 
agreement, the nations were required to intensify their activities and investments towards 
achieving a more sustainable low carbon future. Therefore, the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDC) represented the efforts that would be put forth for maintaining the global 
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temperature rise below 2o C above pre-industrial levels. In addition, an appropriate financial 
flow and an initiative for capacity building would be essential for accomplishing the ambitious 
targets established by the INDCs. Finally, it is also important that these actions can support 
developing and vulnerable countries since the Paris Agreement stresses the necessity to deal 
with the impacts of climate changes (UNFCCC, 2015; 2016). 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that the global contexts involving the UNCHE in 
Stockholm and the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro represented missed opportunities for 
modifications towards improvements. The international environmental governance could have 
benefited from a solid reform during these conferences. Furthermore, the coordination issues 
became more complex over time (CHAMBERS, 2008). Therefore, it is important that the Paris 
Agreement will not represent just another missed opportunity through which international 
politicians make empty promises that will never be kept. Indeed, the real meaning of the Paris 
Agreement will become evident only over the next few years (CLEMENÇON, 2016). 
 
 
2.3 Case Description of the Swedish carbon dioxide tax  
 
 
2.3.1 Background of the carbon dioxide tax for the Swedish heating sector   
 
 
After the Second World War, Sweden was highly dependent on imported oil. In the 
1970s, the country imported 70-80% of its overall oil consumption. Despite abundant forests in 
the countryside, even farmers used heating oil in the boilers instead of firewood due to the 
offsetting oil price (KJELL, 2015). Nevertheless, in 1973 the oil price increased in the global 
market due to the oil shock crises. The Swedish Government imposed the rationing of oil 
products but the consequences of the oil shock prices for the Swedish economy were dramatic 
(KABERGER, 2007; KJELL, 2015).  
Concurrently with the facts mentioned above, an intense debate on nuclear power 
emerged in the country in the same period. Between the late 1970s and mid 1980s there were 
nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and Chernobyl leading to further 
discussions against nuclear power. In the same period, a growing interest in domestic energy 
sources (e.g. peat, woodchips) was noted. Besides that, research on renewable energy sources 
started to take place including not only biomass but also wind and solar power energy. 
Regarding bioenergy, different processes to use biomass in a more efficient way were being 
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considered (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016). Subsequently, the nuclear debate and the 
country’s oil dependency triggered a growing trend towards alternative energy sources among 
Swedish society (KABERGER, 2007; KJELL, 2015).  
In the 1980s, a referendum on nuclear power took place in Sweden and the Parliament 
decided to phase it out by 2010. In addition to that, the discussions on oil replacement became 
stronger (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016; JOHANSSON, 2000; PMR, 2017). Also investment 
grants to support bioenergy development were provided by the Swedish Government to convert 
boilers and heat plants. Initially, it was to replace oil by peat and woodchips, among others. 
However, this financial support also covered the installation of coal boilers (KJELL, 2015). 
At that time, the climate change issue had not been fully considered as an important 
political factor. Oil prices had decreased and the use of bioenergy grew moderately (KJELL, 
2015). However, in the late 1980s a growing public concern on the environment had been given 
rise in developed countries and Sweden followed that trend (HARRISON, 2005).  
In the 1990s, Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a carbon dioxide tax on 
fossil fuels and did so as a part of a major tax reform. The tax adoption promoted a dramatic 
change in the heating sector. Fossil fuels became more expensive for the final user and 
consequently renewable fuels became more competitive (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 
2018). Since then, a deep transformation in the Swedish district heating (DH) happened, 
culminating with the phasing out of oil in the heating market for boilers and heat plants. 
Additionally, investment grants to support new combined heat and power plants (CHPs) using 
biomass to produce bio-electricity were also provided in the 1990s (KJELL, 2015).  
 
 
2.3.2 The energy taxation system and the policymaking process referred to the adoption of the 
carbon dioxide tax in Sweden 
 
 
“People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are at the 
beginning of a mass extinction and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal 






The energy taxation in Sweden is long-standing – oil has been taxed since 1924 and 
diesel since 1937 (HAMMAR and ÅKERFELDT, 2011). An energy tax has also been levied 
on the electricity, oil and coal used for heating purposes since the 1950s. This tax was a financial 
tool that aimed at increasing public revenues (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018). However, 
due to the oil shock crises the energy tax was also considered a way to cut down the oil 
dependence during the 1970s (ENERGIMYNDIGHETEN, 2006). In 1968, Erik Dahmén9 
wrote a book in which he supported a pricing for environmental damages caused by Swedish 
society (DAHMÉN, 1968). On one hand, the fact that environmental fees make possible for 
polluters to buy the right to pollute was a common objection against it. On the other hand, a 
system without pricing allows the polluters to pollute indiscriminately despite the costs 
generated by the emissions to society (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018). 
In the 1970s, the Social Democrat Party was the dominating political party and 
expressed scepticism on implementing economic instruments for protecting the environment. 
This party endorsed administrative instruments (e.g. rules and laws) because the idea of buying 
off the obligation to reduce environmental damages was not supported by it (SCHARIN and 
WALLSTRÖM, 2018). Furthermore, when global warming discussions and related issues 
emerged, the environmental and business groups put forward efforts in terms of trying to lobby 
the government. The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) drew attention to these issues in 1988 
through a national policy on climate change which sustained two main points: the decreasing 
of CO2 and the adoption of a carbon dioxide tax to reduce the demand for fossil fuels 
(JOHNSON, 1998). 
Accordingly, the Environmental Charge Commission (ECC) was created in 1988 to 
assess possibilities for applying economic instruments on energy and transportation. The 
proposition of policy instruments (e.g. carbon dioxide tax) was also aimed by the ECC. The 
first report including fees and taxes was published in 1989 (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 
2018). The ECC was comprised of several interest groups that permeated the Swedish society 
(e.g. the Federation of Swedish Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund - LRF), the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket - EPA), the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the steel industry, the petrochemical 
industry, experts and political parties) (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018). Furthermore, 
the major tax reform was also being outlined to reduce the income tax for the general population 
(SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018; NATIONALENCYKLOPEDIN, 2017). 
                                                
9 Erik Dahmém was a professor of Economics in Sweden (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018).    
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As expected, from one side the environmental groups endorsed the adoption of a carbon 
dioxide tax and they were supported by the Centre and Left parties lobbying parliament in favor 
of the tax. Indeed, the Liberal Party, the Green Party and the EPA agreed on the replacement 
of the energy tax by the carbon dioxide tax because the respective purpose was purely financial 
whereas this was in fact connected to climate change issues. The Centre Party and the 
Federation of Swedish Farmers endorsed the adoption of the tax claiming benefits over 
bioenergy production (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018).  
From the other side, the industry sector and the Federation of Swedish Industries 
(Svenska Industriefoerbundet)10 lobbied parliament to decline the carbon dioxide tax 
(JOHNSON, 1998). They were concerned that a higher tax burden would impact their business. 
In addition to that, the industry sector was granted deductions over the energy tax. Driven by 
fear of losing these benefits they did not support the adoption of the carbon tax. The Moderate 
Party was also against the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden (SCHARIN and 
WALLSTRÖM, 2018).    
However, within parliament the idea of a carbon dioxide tax was not strongly opposed 
as society was quite used to high levels of taxation. Plus, the majority of Swedish 
parliamentarians had a public sector background (JOHNSON, 1998). The Social Democratic 
Party was strongly involved in the discussions surrounding the carbon dioxide tax. The party 
needed support in parliament due to the major tax reform that was also being negotiated at the 
same time (SOU, 1989; 2007). After a long negotiation process involving the policy actors 
mentioned above, a political consensus was reached on the adoption of the carbon tax 
(SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018).  
A broad hearing for the carbon tax adoption took place. Subsequently, the respective 
bill proposing it was sent to the parliament (Prop. 1989/90:111). Then, the parliament decided 
to implement the carbon tax by law (SFS 1990:582) (SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018). 
Concomitantly with the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax, the parliament also decreased 
income taxes (JOHNSON, 1998). In addition, some substantial concessions were applied to the 
industry. Indeed, the carbon tax protected energy-intensive industries (e.g. pulp and paper, 
cement, iron and steel, chemicals) from paying higher taxes. Nonetheless, in 1996 a standard 
carbon taxation was applied for all branches of the manufacturing sector (SWEDEN, 1994). 
Even so, the idea of taxing energy due to CO2 emissions was relatively acceptable by Swedish 
                                                
10 The Federation of Swedish Industries (Svenska Industriefoerbundet) was an umbrella company for the 
manufacturing group (JOHNSON, 1998).  
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society (SWEDEN, 1991; SCHARIN and WALLSTRÖM, 2018), as explored in the next 
sections.   
 
 
2.3.3 The forestry sector in Sweden 
 
 
The welfare state built by the Swedes has a connection with the forestry industry sector 
(e.g. timber and pulp and paper industries). Within this sector, Swedish companies are among 
the global leaders. As a result, rigid forest laws led to the increase of substantial production 
levels within the sector, mainly in relation to the pulp and paper sector. However, the increase 
of the conservation lobby controlled the rise of the referred production levels in the 1990s 
(HAMILTON, 1997).  
Later on, bioenergy production was stimulated and expanded rapidly. From the Kyoto 
period until 2015, the increasing use of bioenergy was the major element behind the reduction 
of GHG emissions in Sweden (KJELL, 2015). The largest source of raw material used to 
generate bioenergy is concentrated in forests. The by-products generated from sawmills (e.g. 
bark and wood chips), pulp mills (e.g. bark) and forest operations (e.g. branches and tops) can 
be utilized to produce energy in heat plants and CHP plants (JOELSSON and 
ATHANASSIADIS, 2015). 
The forestry industry sector in Sweden is comprised by the following: the pulp and 
paper industry, the sawmill industry, the wood board industry, the production of packaging 
from wood, paper and board, the carpentry industry and the industry for the manufacture of 
refined wood fuel. Furthermore, the forestry sector includes the producers and suppliers of 
forest feedstock to the industry (JOELSSON and ATHANASSIADIS, 2015). The pulp and 
paper industry in Sweden plays an important role in the economy, promoting a substantial 
contribution to the trade balance. It is an energy intensive and export-oriented industry, having 
a renowned process optimization to compete in the global market (STENQVIST et al., 2011).  
The sawmill industry can be classified in two main categories. The first one is connected 
to the large forest industry producing saw wood in parallel to the manufacture of pulp and paper, 
among other forest products. The second one is not linked to other industries. The other 
companies forming the forestry industry such as the wood board industry and the wood refining 
companies (e.g. manufacturers of wooden houses and furniture) are smaller and represent a 
minor economic importance. The forest ownership structure in Sweden encompass a mixture 
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of family companies and corporate ownership. Furthermore, the state is also an important 
ownership in Sweden (JOELSSON and ATHANASSIADIS, 2015). Figure 2.1 shows the 




 Figure 2.1. Sweden’s share of the world’s (FOREST AND FORESTS IN SWEDEN, 2015) 
 
 
2.3.4 The institutional design in Sweden  
 
 
Sweden presents a parliamentary democracy through which people are represented by 
the Swedish parliament that holds a legislative power. The Swedish Government implements 
the parliament’s decisions and also develops proposals for the creation of new laws. The general 
elections take place every four years when the population have the opportunity to influence the 
parties representing them in the parliament, county and municipal councils. Therefore, the 
voters elect those who will decide on how Sweden will be administered and governed 
(SWEDEN, 2014). 
In addition to that, the country counts on three levels of government – national, regional 
and local. Moreover, the European level is also important as Sweden has been an EU member 
since 1995. Taking into account the national level, the parliament represents the Swedes, 
counting on legislative power as referred above. Still considering the national level, the Swedish 
Government presents the proposals for new laws and also implements the resolutions that are 
handed down by the parliament. Also, the Government Offices have the role to assist the 
Swedish Government. They hold a substantial number of ministries, and approximately 400 
central governmental agencies and public administrations. As for the regional level, the country 
is divided in 21 counties. The political tasks are duties of the county councils in general 
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(SWEDEN, 2015). 
Pursuant to the local level, Sweden comprises 290 municipalities, having a proper 
municipal council which is an elected assembly and taking decisions over municipality matters.   
This council is responsible for appointing the municipal executive board as well as to lead and 
organize the work related to that municipality. Finally, the European level is also important in 
Sweden. Due to its entry in the EU in 1995, the country acquired the European level of 
government. Therefore, when new rules are created and approved within EU, Sweden 
participates in the respective decision-making process. The country is represented by the 




2.3.5 The Swedish law-making process   
 
 
 The Government begins the process of submitting legislative proposals to the Swedish 
Parliament. However, the members of parliament and some committees can also submit new 
legislative proposals to the Swedish Parliament, characterizing the first phase for legislative 
change (SWEDEN, 2016). Afterwards, a commission of inquiry will analyse and evaluate the 
issue discussed thereof before the elaboration of a legislative proposal by the government 
comprising the inquiry stage. The inquiry bodies work independently from the Government. 
They are formed by public officials, experts in different fields, and politicians that prepare the 
inquiry report presenting the respective proposals. These reports are published by the Swedish 
Government11 (SWEDEN, 2015). 
Thus, the consultation process takes place and the inquiry report is circulated among 
important consultation bodies (e.g. governmental agents, local authorities and interest groups) 
that will be impacted by the proposal. Whenever the majority of these bodies are opposing a 
recommendation the government will work towards an alternative solution. This stage is 
fundamental because it provides useful feedback and also allows the government to measure 
any given support for a proposal (SWEDEN, 2016). 
After the consultant bodies have handed down their comments, the ministry responsible 
can then draft the bill which will be submitted to the parliament. The inquiry report and the 
                                                
11 These reports are named Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU)  
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suggestions from the consultation bodies are important because the members of the 
Government need to achieve consensus before a bill is settled. Then, the consultation of the 
Council on Legislation is the next step. It is important to assure conformity with the legal system 
and accordance with a statute with constitutional law. The Council on Legislation is a 
consultative body, and not a decision-making element (SWEDEN, 2015). 
Following the parliamentary process, once the committee has concluded on its 
deliberations a report is submitted and the respective bill is handed to parliament for approval. 
Once the bill is approved, it becomes a law. In general, a law is enacted through a single 
majority choice of the parliament. However, through the standing committees, the members of 
parliament can settle a counter-proposal or amendment for a new bill. In the cases in which the 
counter-proposal is adopted by the parliament, the government is compelled to implement the 
provisions thereof. Finally, after the successful course through parliament is verified, a new law 
will be promulgated by the Swedish Government. The new laws are issued in compliance with 










2.3.6 The influence of institutional culture on the forestry sector in Sweden  
 
 
The institutional decision-making cultural feature in Sweden is characterized by 
egalitarian collectivism that focuses on a broad and strong social welfare. The participation of 
different policy actors is also a remarkable characteristic thereof (SOU, 1998), being based on 
the ideals of equality and moderation. Consensus and regard for others is also part of the 
Swedish values (JOHNSON, 1998). Additionally, the country presents an informal structure 
and an openness oriented culture in comparison with other European fellow countries 
(TÖRNKVIST, 2013).  
A culture of transparency is also noted for lobbying activities (TÖRNKVIST, 2013). 
The members of the parliament, industry in general and NGOs frequently know each other 
because Sweden is such a small country. Within this context, lobbying is informally promoted 
across personal networks and is referred to as “brotherhood corruption” (JOHNSON, 1998). 
Indeed, lobbying in Sweden is also considered an instrument of communication and lobbyists 
are messengers communicating information to decision-makers (SOU, 1998). Furthermore, 
there are no specific rules about the access to key documents and to the parliament. In other 
words, Swedish politicians do not regulate lobbying (TÖRNKVIST, 2013).  
 Furthermore, the participation of several policy actors within the institutional decision-
making process turns lobbying into a time-consuming duty (SOU, 1998). Besides that, an 
isolated politician rarely would act outside its party platform. In general, lobbyists focus their 
efforts on trying to influence the public opinion and the parties as a whole instead of a politician 
alone. Therefore, a slow and broader strategy is demanded, for tackling many fronts 
(TÖRNKVIST, 2013). Moreover, when parliament approves a legislation it means that the 
matter in question has already been broadly discussed through negotiations between the 
interested groups12 (e.g. NGOs, companies, municipalities and government organizations) 
(LOEFSTEDT, 1993). 
Regarding the forestry sector in Sweden, the pulp and paper industry has an important 
economic significance and a consequent political influence (HARRISON, 2005). Taking into 
account the branch associations within the industry and forestry sectors, the Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige - LO), the LRF and the Confederation of 
                                                
12 The interest groups can also review and comment over the legislation suggested in the parliament by a 
procedure called “remiss” (LOEFSTEDT 1993). 
	
 34 
Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt näringsliv) have been traditionally adept on exerting political 
pressure for a long period of time in Sweden (TÖRNKVIST, 2013).  
Apart from them, the Swedish Forest Industries Federation (Skogsindustrierna) is also 
an active organization in this field. This federation represents 50 pulp and paper manufacturers 
owned by 20 groups of companies, 120 wood mechanical industries owned by 60 companies 
and 40 companies that have discontinued production relations with the pulp and paper industry 
and sawn timber manufactures (LOBBYFACTS.EU, 2019). Table 2.1 shows the lobby activity 
of the Swedish Forest Industries Federation from 2011 to 2018, presenting lobby costs and the 
lobbyists declared. Figure 2.3 shows the lobbying costs incurred over these years. Before 2001 
no data was found, however this information is relevant to contextualize the next chapters.  
 
Table 2.1. Lobby of the Swedish Forest Industries Federation (Skogsindustrierna) 
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Figure 2.3. Lobbying costs of the Swedish Forest Industries Federation (LOBBYFACTS.EU, 2019).  
 
 35 
Taking into account the branch associations at the bioenergy sector, Graph 2.4 shows 
the lobbying costs incurred by the Swedish Bioenergy Association (Svenska 




Figure 2.4. Lobbying costs of the Swedish Bioenergy Association (LOBBYFACTS.EU, 2018).  
 
 
2.3.7 Public acceptance of the carbon tax in Sweden  
 
 
The environmental taxes are unpopular among citizens for many reasons. The 
legitimacy represented by public support is a challenge for the politicians, even when the 
population is aware of the advantages of these taxes (HAMMAR and JAGERS, 2007; BIEL 
and LUNDQVIST, 2007). This is mainly because environmental taxes focus on the symptoms 
and not on deep value transformations within society (DOBSON, 2003). Nevertheless, citizens 
have a higher tendency to endorse environmental taxes when they rely on their co-citizens (e.g. 
when they believe that others will pay the related share) and on their politicians (HAMMAR 
and JAGERS, 2006). 
Taking into account the public perception of the carbon pricing schemes (e.g. carbon 
taxes) the reasons of (un)popularity are also connected to (i) political trust, (ii) low corruption 
stage and (iii) cultural world perspectives (FUNKE and MATTAUCH, 2018; BARANZINI et 
al., 2014; RAFATY, 2018). However, these policies tend to promote a scenario characterized 
by concentrated costs and diffuse benefits whereas a successful policy adoption would have the 
opposite situation. In this scenario, even the dispersed beneficiaries of a policy in this field have 
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a low tendency to support it. Indeed, if the benefits of carbon policies are focused on 
constituencies that will endorse the course and preservation of that policy, the chances of 
success would be higher. Moreover, due to successive partisan changes it is important to 
consider a broad political spectrum formed by different constituencies (FUNKE and 
MATTAUCH, 2018; OLSON, 1965). 
In spite of that, Sweden adopted the carbon tax in 1991 obtaining a successful outcome 
(FUNKE and MATTAUCH, 2018). Furthermore, the carbon tax shows a relatively popularity 
in Sweden. Taking into account 11 other taxes and climate policy instruments the carbon tax 
was considered the third least unpopular according to a research (JAGERS and HAMMAR 
2009). Also, the adoption of the carbon tax in Sweden was based on public discussions 
alongside social deliberation throughout the whole process. These elements empowered 
political reliability and transparency in relation to this tax. (FUNKE and MATTAUCH, 2018) 
as shown in Figure 2.5. Accordingly, Sweden has the highest carbon price among countries 
using carbon pricing schemes, as well as the highest public trust in politicians and a low 




Figure 2.5. Carbon prices linked to public trust and perceived corruption (FUNKE and MATTAUCH, 2018).  
 
  
 Besides that, the Swedes are used to high taxation rates (ECKERSLEY 2004). The 
obvious general standard considers that most of them would prefer to reduce all taxes instead 
of increasing them. However, the willingness to maintain the welfare state is stronger than the 
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reluctance against paying taxes (NILSSON, 1995). Finally, the green and ecological awareness 
is quite significant among Swedes (ECKERSLEY, 2004).  
 
 
2.3.8 Description and effects of the carbon tax for the Swedish heating sector   
 
 
As previously referred the discussions over oil replacement intensified in the 1980s. 
However, the use of alternative fuels such as biomass had not been strongly encouraged until 
1991 when the carbon tax was adopted and the energy tax13 was reduced by half (ERICSON 
and WERNER, 2016; JOHANSSON, 2000). Sweden was among the first countries to introduce 
a carbon tax alongside Norway and Finland (HAMMAR and ÅKERFELDT, 2011). The tax 
was levied on fossil fuels for transportation and heating purposes (PMR, 2017). The initial 
amount of the tax was 24 EUR/tonne CO2. Afterwards, this amount increased by 114 
EUR/tonne CO2 in 2019 (GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN, 2019). Similarly, the 
relevance of the carbon tax has increased in the long run (NATURVÅRDSVERKET, 2017).  
The targets to be achieved from the adoption of the tax were the following: (i) decrease 
in fossil fuel consumption, (ii) reduction of CO2 emissions and (iii) stimulation towards 
technological innovation (PMR, 2017). Approximately 500 companies are legally required to 
pay the carbon tax in Sweden. Many of them are large industrial consumers. However, these 
companies are generally fuel distributors who transfer the tax cost to fossil fuels users – 
downstream (SUMNER et al., 2009; PMR, 2017). The Swedish Tax Agency administers the 
carbon dioxide tax, monitoring and reporting GHG emissions (PMR, 2017; WORLD BANK 
2014, SUMNER et al., 2009). The revenue commonly goes to the general government fund 
(SUMNER et al., 2009; PMR, 2017). Furthermore, from 1990 to 2017, the GHG equivalent 
emissions were decreased by 26% and the GDP increased approximately 78% as shown in 
Figure 2.6.  
 
                                                
13 The energy tax was implemented in the 1950s, being levied on energy utilized for heating and engines, with the 




Figure 2.6. GDP and GHG emissions since the carbon tax adoption (SWEDEN, 2019). 
 
Besides the reduction of GHG emissions, the proportion of the energy use from 
renewables increased substantially (PMR, 2017; SUMNER et al., 2009). The tax pushed 
changes towards fossil fuels released in the DH systems (ACKVA and HOPE, 2018; 
JOHANSSON, 2000) since then the cost of coal doubled as opposed to the cost of biomass 
which became cheaper (ERICSON et al., 2004). Thus, the use of fossil fuels gradually 
decreased whereas the use of waste and biomass substantially increased in the DH systems as 




Figure 2.7. Energy provided to the DH systems for heating supply in Sweden corresponding to energy allocation 
(JÖNKÖPING, 2014).  
 
The biomass production was initially introduced in the DH systems in the 1980s and 
was composed of wood fuels (e.g. wood chips, sawdust) (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016; 
STATISTICS OF SWEDEN, 2014). Later on in the 1990s an expansion in biomass production 
 39 
took shape mainly in medium and large-biomass fired plants (STATISTICS OF SWEDEN, 
2014). The majority of the biomass in Sweden was produced domestically and supplied by 
forest industries and subsidiary companies. Furthermore, the country counted on the availability 
of forest resources and the infrastructure of the forestry industry (ERICSON and WERNER, 
2016).  
The transition from oil and coal towards biomass occurred gradually in the DH system 
through a number of technical development steps. Initially, co-firing of biomass with coal and 
oil and the conversion of existing oil-fired boilers to biomass were utilized. In a second stage, 
there was the development of combustion technologies (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016). The 
development of new procedures of biomass extraction and a biomass market were also 
important consequences of the carbon tax (JOHANSSON, 2000; ERICSON and WERNER, 
2016).  
Besides that, due to the increasing demand for bioenergy in the 1990s, numerous 
mechanical solutions have been developed (e.g. heavy duty chippers, compaction machine for 
logging residue, multi-tree-handling felling in small wood vegetation) (JOHANSSON, 2000). 
Several procedures for simultaneous extraction of log and logging residues were also improved. 
An example of that is a harvester technology which gathers tops and branches in the same 
manner as the stems are processed; and it then continues compacting the resulting material into 
composite residue logs. This technology could promote a cost reduction of 20 - 40%, also 
lessening the demand for machinery (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016; JOHANSSON, 2000). 
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the mechanical equipment development and biomass plants 
improvement as a consequence of the growing demand for bioenergy in the 1990s.  
 
 Table 2.1. Technology development influenced by the growing demand for biomass 
 
Mechanical equipment developed Mechanical equipment in development  
(at that time) 
Improvements of energy efficiency in the 
biomass plant 
Heavy Duty Chippers 
Compaction machine for logging 
residue 
Multi-tree-handling felling in small 
wood vegetation 
Procedures for simultaneous extraction of log 
and logging residues 
Harvester technology 
Utilization of flue gas condensation 
(adapted from: JOHANSSON, 2000). 
 
The biomass market was developed as a consequence of the expanding potential of 
biomass suppliers to the heat plants. Furthermore, the combination of a growing demand for 
biomass with market pressure was fundamental to combine increased demand with declining 
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prices (JOHANSSON, 2000). Accordingly, the expansion of biomass production at the DH 
system influenced the adoption of flue gas condensation, increasing the efficiency of the 
biomass plant at 10 - 25% (JOHANSSON, 2000; ERICSON and WERNER, 2016).  
In this scenario, the carbon dioxide tax should be an important factor towards a 
transition in the DH system also influencing investment related decisions (BOHLIN, 1998). 
Some strong regional commitments advocating for local renewable sources utilization also 
played a fundamental role in the investment decisions taking into account the construction of 
biomass-fired DH plants (ERICSON and WERNER, 2016). Therefore, as referred to above, the 
gradual removal of fuel oil is a consequence of the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in 
Sweden. Besides that, the expansion of biomass production led to a development in technology 
for biomass extraction in forestry and in the implementation of more efficient heat plants in the 
DH system (ACKVA and HOPE, 2018).  
 
 
2.4 Case Description of RenovaBio in Brazil  
 
 
“The world is a dangerous place to live; not because of the people who are evil, but because 




2.4.1 Background on the RenovaBio  
 
 
 The use of biofuel in Brazil started in the 1930s through the use of ethanol-gasoline 
blending (ROTHMAN et al., 1983). Afterwards, 5% of ethanol started to be added to the 
imported gasoline in 1931. The same percentage was added to the national gasoline in 1939. 
Between 1946 and 1950, 42% of ethanol was added to gasoline in Brazil. However, there was 
a reduced interest in ethanol by the Brazilian Government and the business community between 
the 1950s and 1960s (GIACOMAZZI, 2012).     
In the 1970s, the oil shock prices occurred and energy supply was considered a priority 
(ROSILLO-CALLE and CORTEZ, 1998). Within this context, the National Program of 
Alcohol (Proalcool) was adopted in 1975 in Brazil. The purpose of this program was the 
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development of anhydrous ethyl alcohol fuel to be used as added combustible to gasoline. The 
motivations were related to (i) the need to reduce oil imports, (ii) the oil shock prices and (iii) 
the idle capacity of the sugarcane sector at that time (RAMOS and BELIK, 1989; OHASHI, 
2008). 
The third motivation was linked to the expansion of the sugarcane sector. Substantial 
investments in infrastructure were made and sugar was the main product. However, a reversal 
of the sugar market expectations occurred and the investments promoted still needed to be 
amortized. The solution was an increasing alcohol production of anhydrous ethyl alcohol fuel, 
since the infrastructure for producing alcohol and sugar was quite similar. Therefore, the 
incentive to enhance alcohol production was considered a strategic movement through the 
Proalcool (RAMOS and BELIK, 1989; OHASHI, 2008). 
This program presented some phases with the first one implemented in the period from 
1975 to 1979 and characterized by the respective creation and stability. Subsequently, the 
consolidation took place between 1979 and 1985. The program faced ongoing development 
until the low international oil prices started to change this scenario between 1985 and 1989 
(ROSILLO-CALLE and CORTEZ, 1998). Then, a stagnation phase occurred until 1997 
followed by a redefinition of the program between 1997 and 2000. Afterwards, a deregulation 
within the ethanol sector was verified in 2000. However, the development of the flex-fuel 
technology indirectly contributed to support this sector as from 2003 (GIACOMAZZI, 2012). 





Figure 2.8. Energy and bioenergy consumption in Brazil (1970-2016) (EPE/MME, 2017).  
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With regard to initiatives considering climate change issues, the Brazilian Government 
passed a law establishing the National Policy on Climate Change in 2009. The main goals of 
this policy were the reduction of GHG emissions through the use of clean energy and the 
economic and social deployment in compliance with the protection of the climate system 
(BRAZIL, 2010). 
Afterwards, considering the Paris Agreement through the NDC, Brazil has made a 
commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% in 2025 taking 2005 as reference point. It 
was the only developing country that adopted set forth reduction targets for its entire economy. 
In addition to that, Brazil ratified the Paris Agreement on September 12, 2016 concentrating 
efforts on agriculture, energy and deforestation (BRAZIL, 2016). In order to accomplish the 
reduction of the country’s GHG emissions, the RenovaBio was launched by the MME in 
December 2016 (BRASIL, 2018d). 
 
 
2.4.2 The policymaking process for the adoption of RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
 
As referred previously, the MME launched RenovaBio in December 2016. 
Subsequently, the Brazilian Government and the productive sector discussed the premises and 
objectives of the program. This step was fundamental to build the proposal that was to be the 
base for the program’s public hearing. Subsequently, the period of the public hearing began on 
February 15, 2017 and ended on March 03, 2017. In the beginning of June 2017 the National 
Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) approved the strategic guidelines for the program. In 
addition, the deliberation of the CNPE settled the working group for RenovaBio. This group 
was in charge of assessing the proposals of revisions to implement the program within the 
shortest time possible, according to the strategic guidelines thereof (BRASIL, 2018d).       
The bill was forwarded to the Civil House in June 2017 by the MME. In November 
2017 the bill was submitted at the Chamber of Deputies where it underwent urgent processing 
due to a request by the deputy from the Green Party that had presented it originally. In 
November 2017 the bill was approved by a section of the Chamber of Deputies. The voting at 





Table 2.2: Votes at the Chamber of Deputies 
Party  In favour Against 
Socialism and Liberty Party  PSOL 0 5 
Sustainability Network REDE 1 2 
Democratic Labour Party PDT 14 1 
Brazilian Labour Party PTB 4 1 
Green Party PV 6 0 
Brazilian Socialist Party PSB 22 0 
Progressive Party PP 28 0 
Democrats DEM 18 0 
Brazilian Democratic Movement PMDB 32 0 
Social Democratic Party PSD 22 0 
Republican Party of the Social Order PROS 5 0 
Workers' Party PT 35 0 
Popular Socialist Party PPS 6 0 
Brazilian Social Democracy Party PSDB 25 0 
Liberal Party PR 29 0 
Communist Party of Brazil PcdoB 10 0 
Brazilian Republican Party PRB 10 0 
Social Liberal Party PSL 2 0 
National Ecologic Party PEN 1 0 
Solidarity Party  Solidariedade 8 0 
Humanist Party of Solidarity PHS 3 0 
 Podemos 8 0 
Social Christian Party PSC 8 0 
 Without party 2 0 
(elaborated from: NOVACANA, 2017) 
 
In December 2017 the bill was submitted to the Senate for a voting purposes.  After the 
procedures were carried out at the National Congress, the bill was sanctioned by the President 
of the Republic of Brazil. The decree implementing RenovaBio was signed on March 14, 2018 
and published in the Official Journal of the Union on March 15, 2018 (BRASIL, 2018d). 
 
 
2.4.3 The bioenergy sector in Brazil   
  
 
Bioenergy is the main source of renewable energy in Brazil (IEA, 2018) as shown in 





Figure 2.9. Primary energy supply of renewable energy resources in Brazil (OECD/IEA, 2018). 
  
The solid biomass composes the majority of bioenergy in Brazil mainly because of the 
bagasse generated by the sugar-energy industry. The biofuels are also very important for the 
generation of bioenergy as shown in Figure 2.10. Also, gasoline in Brazil has anhydrous 




Figure 2.10. Primary energy supply from bioenergy in Brazil (OECD/IEA, 2018).  
 
Thus, the bioenergy share in Brazil ranged from 27% to 30% in the last few years mainly 
due to the production of solid biomass and liquid biofuels if we consider the total primary 
energy supply (TPES). The bioenergy consumption presented a constant pattern from 1990 to 
2000. However, between 2000 and 2010 bioenergy raised by 75%. Subsequently, from 2005 to 
2010 the demand for liquid biofuels increased significantly and after that the rank for liquid 
biofuels and solid biomass stabilized. In 2012 an increase in liquid biofuels was verified and 





Figure 2.1.1 The primary energy supply from bioenergy in Brazil (OECD/IEA, 2018).  
  
The bioenergy sector in Brazil comprises the industrial and agricultural segments apart 
from the regulatory and distribution segments. The industrial segment is formed by industrial 
plants (sugar, ethanol, co-products and electric-power) and the industries’ operations relate to 
production assets and maintenance service providers. The agricultural segment encompasses 
sugarcane suppliers. The regulatory segment is formed by sectorial organizations (e.g. the 
Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association - UNICA) and some governmental bodies working 




2.4.4 The institutional design in Brazil  
 
 
 Brazil presents a federal presidential system and is formed by 26 states. The Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial powers are formed by independent branches of government and they 
in fact represent the federal government. The first one - executive power - is governed by the 
President who is counselled by the Cabinet. The President is elected by vote and remains in 
government for a four-year mandate with the possibility of running for a re-election. He or She 
is the Head of State and the Head of the Government, also legislating through the editing of 
provisional measures. The president proposes and the legislature can accept (or not) what was 
previously proposed (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2000). The second one - the legislative 
power is formed by the Chamber of Deputies representing all Brazilian citizens; and the Senate, 
representing the states (BRAZIL, 2019a). The third one - the judiciary power - has the role to 
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guarantee individual, collective and social rights and also to solve conflicts involving the state, 
entities and citizens. Consequently, it has autonomy with regard to finance and administration 
aspects guaranteed by the constitution (BRAZIL, 2019b). 
The Brazilian system is marked by a dominance of the executive branch which has 
substantial regulatory powers (OLIVEIRA, 2004). This is a consequence of the extension of 
the legislative branch managed by the president which in turn has an impact on the political 
system in Brazil and changes the dynamics of the relations among executive and legislative 
branches (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2000). Therefore, the legislative power could be 
regarded as an executive agent. However, there is a higher openness for dialogue among society 
as far as the legislative power is concerned. Indeed, the executive power also has the role to 
represent society as a whole (CESARIO, 2013). 
 
 
2.4.5 The Brazilian law-making process   
  
 
 In Brazil a new law is made through a deputy or a senator who submits a draft bill for 
analysis and subsequent approval. Then, the draft bill should be examined by the commissions 
which are specialized bodies organized by this field, involving a lesser number of 
parliamentarians. The commission will analyse the draft bill and prepare a position paper 
communicating if the draft bill should be approved (or not). When the creation of the law is the 
responsibility of the National Congress, formed by the Chamber of Deputies and Federal 
Senate, the draft bill will be presented and voted in one of the referred houses. Once the draft 
bill is approved, it will be forwarded to the other house - the reviewers’ house - for a second 
voting. At this house the senators will decide whether the draft bill will require changes 
(BRAZIL, 2019a). 
The creation of an ordinary law (a common legislative proposal in Brazil) should be 
approved through the majority of favourable votes from senators and deputies provided a 
minimum of half the number of these parliamentarians give their vote. Following the law-
making process, the draft bill still must be submitted for purposes of presidential sanction. At 
this stage, the president can veto the draft bill to some extent or completely if it is considered 
not to be in accordance with the constitution. However, the president’s veto can be rejected 
(and invalidated) if the majority of the deputies and senators decide that the draft bill (or part 
of it) has a degree of validity. After the approval from deputies and senators as well as the 
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presidential sanction, the draft bill will be promulgated and become law. Finally, the last step 
is the publication of the law (BRAZIL, 2019a). 
 
 
2.4.6 The influence of institutional culture focusing on the bioenergy sector in Brazil 
  
  
In Brazil there is no legislation to regulate the lobbying activity (ARAGÃO, 2012). 
Nevertheless, some indirect rules are related to this issue (e.g. the constitution settles the 
freedom of association and also the right of petition instrument). Therefore, the right to possess 
collective interests presented by associations and to demand provision of information are 
guaranteed by the constitution. Considering the legislative procedures in Brazil, the constitution 
assures that committees are supposed to encourage public audiences including important 
organizations for the civil society. Furthermore, there is an inner code edited by the Chamber 
of Deputies demanding the registration of representatives within the civil society and 
Government at the legislative branch (SANTOS and TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, 2012). 
The Civil House is also authorized to decide over the submission for general 
consultation to the public regarding drafts to propose new legislation that has a political or 
social meaning. This central governmental body can receive suggestions from entities and 
organizations both from the public and private sectors, as well as people in general (SANTOS 
and TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, 2012). However, the discussions over lobbying in Brazil is 
complicated because it is stigmatized by cases of corruption in the country (OLIVEIRA, 2004). 
Lobbying does not have a positive connotation (SCHNEIDER 1997-1998) being associated 
with influence peddling, political corruption and pressure in general. There is also a connection 
with major corporations (having economic power) as main policy actors who conduct lobbying 
practices in order to achieve determined targets (MANCUSO, 2010; OLIVEIRA, 2004). 
Additionally, the lack of regulation referred to above implies in influence peddling and 
corruption (e.g. some policy actors can provide benefits in general influencing the decision-
making process with the aim of a favourable decision). The business sector in Brazil can act in 
a collective way and is able to identify a substantial bill that will favour the sector, therefore 
defending its positions and obtaining a positive outcome (MANCUSO, 2010). This sector has 
a substantial degree of political success primarily because the constitution in Brazil grants 
legislative powers to the Executive branch within the government (MANCUSO, 2010). Thus, 
the Executive power develops a fundamental role within the legislative production being the 
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author of the majority of the propositions that eventually will be turned into laws (FIGUREIDO 
and LIMONGI, 2000).  
In view of the above, the business sector tends to promote political lobbying at the 
Executive branch during the course of the legislative process, mainly when the author of a 
proposition is from the executive sector. During the negotiation of bills, the members of the 
National Congress act as stakeholders or mediators of controversies involving numerous 
interests. Furthermore, political pressure on the executive branch from organizations (e.g. 
business sector) in general occurs during this stage (MANCUSO, 2010).  
With regard to the bioenergy sector, UNICA was created in the 1990s providing 
professional lobby to the bioenergy sector. It was formed by producers, researchers and 
advocates of clean energy that consider bioethanol a potential replacer for oil derivatives.  They 
advocate the increasing bioethanol use as it results in the reduction of GHG emissions 
(MANDUCA and BERNI, 2018). Also, UNICA is the most important bioenergy organization 
in Brazil representing more than 50% of all ethanol production and 60% of sugar production in 
the country (LOBBYFACTS, 2017). Following is Figure 2.12 showing the lobbying costs 




Figure 2.12. Lobbying costs of the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) (LOBBYFACTS, 2017).  
 
Unfortunately, studies over the public acceptance over the adoption of RenovaBio in 




2.4.7 Description of RenovaBio in Brazil    
 
 
RenovaBio is a state policy developed to recognize a strategic role played by biofuels 
in the Brazilian energy matrix linked to energy security and mitigation of GHG emissions.  
However, RenovaBio does not require subsidies, carbon dioxide taxes or tax increase on 
biofuels (BRAZIL, 2018a). The program aims to create a market-based mechanism in order to 
encourage the promotion of higher energy efficiency along with the decreasing of the carbon 
footprint (BIOFUTURE PLATFORM, 2018).  
The official objectives are: (i) compliance with the commitment established under the 
Paris Agreement, (ii) promote biofuel expansion at the energy matrix focusing on regularity of 
fuel supply and (iii) ensure predictability for the fuel market by promoting energy efficiency 
gains and reduction of GHG emissions, when biofuels are produced, commercialized and 
utilized (BRAZIL, 2018b). Figure 2.13 shows the current fuel market in Brazil characterized 
by the spot market. Subsequently, Figure 2.14 presents the innovation RenovaBio will introduce 
through the econometric model that defines the program.      
 
 





Figure 2.14 Innovation introduced by RenovaBio (BRAZIL, 2018d).  
 
 
RenovaBio is anchored on (i) the annual decarbonization goals established by the 
Brazilian government considering a minimum 10-year period; (ii) the issuing of GHG 
emissions reduction certificates - CBIO14 and (iii) the use of life cycle assessment (LCA) for 
the biofuel production certification (BIOFUTURE PLATFORM, 2018). Initially the CNPE is 
in charge of recommending an annual decarbonization goal that will be established by the 
executive power of government for a minimum period of 10 years. Subsequently, the National 
Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP) will allocate the national mandatory 
targets to individual targets. Then, these targets will be applied to fuel distributors in proportion 
to the respective shares within the fossil fuel market, considering the previous year (BRAZIL, 
2018c; BIOFUTURE PLATFORM, 2018).  
The fuel distributors will accumulate a determined volume of the CBIO in accordance 
with their strategy towards achieving the individual target. The fuel distributors can provide 
evidence of its compliance with the individual goal through purchasing CBIO in the same 
amount of its obligations. Otherwise, the fuel distributors will suffer penalties. In addition, the 
ANP can also enforce administrative and monetary sanctions. The CBIO is equivalent to a 
decreasing of one ton of CO2eq. in relation to fossil fuel emissions. RenovaBio contemplates 
different biofuel sources having many capacities in relation to the contribution of GHG 
                                                
14 CBIO is a decarbonization credit  
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reduction. Thus, each biofuel will be classified through a determined level of carbon emissions. 
This classification will be specified based on the LCA of the biofuel (BIOFUTURE 
PLATFORM, 2018). 
The authorized biofuel producers will distribute the CBIO in line with the volume of 
each bill related to their biofuel sales. The imported biofuel is also considered to be certified. 
The CBIO generated in this process by biofuel producers will be commercialized in the 
Brazilian stock exchange market. Then, the fuel distributors should purchase CBIO with the 
purpose of accomplishing their individual mandates. The medium rate between the amount of 
CBIO that fuel distributors should buy in order to accomplish their targets and the amounts of 
certificates available annually will establish the respective price. Therefore, the demand for 
CBIO will be connected to the national decarbonization goal on an annual basis. Other market 
factors (e.g. oil prices and biofuel supply) will also influence this demand (BIOFUTURE 
PLATFORM, 2018). 
To sum up, the Brazilian Government aims at increasing the participation of renewable 
fuels in line with the market growth through RenovaBio. The implementation of a public policy 
introducing predictability to the biofuel market and favoring a balanced scenario within fossil 
fuels handling is also important. This scenario will encourage innovation and searching for 
energy efficiency on an ongoing basis (BRASIL, 2018d). Finally, these aims are underpinned 
by the Brazilian commitment under the Paris Agreement (BIOFUTURE PLATFORM, 2018).  
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3 METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION 
 
 
“I believe in intuition and inspiration. … At times I feel certain I am right while not knowing 
the reason. When the eclipse of 1919 confirmed my intuition, I was not in the least surprised. 
In fact I would have been astonished had it turned out otherwise. Imagination is more 
important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the 
entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution. It is, strictly speaking, a real 




3.1 Initial Considerations 
 
 
In this chapter the methodology is explored. Section 3.2 presents the typology of actors 
for bilateral negotiations as the framework, followed by the leadership styles. Subsequently, 
the research design for the carbon dioxide tax focused on the Swedish heating sector is 
presented under section 3.4, being comprised by data collection and data analysis. The same 
structure is fulfilled by the Brazilian analysis in section 3.5. Closing this Chapter, section 3.6 
presents a brief analysis of transparency on public policies.     
 
 
3.2 Description of the typology of actors for bilateral negotiations 
 
 
The profiles of the policy actors involved in a process are fundamental to find suitable 
strategies in negotiation cases. In a general way, it is possible to characterize the profiles of the 
policy actors through some parameters. One of the most important is based on the roles related 
to the functional distribution within a negotiation coalition (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015), 
being named as typology of actors (CAENI, 2018). Taking into account a coalition, a defining 
characteristic of it is the presence of joint actions, commonly in concert, in order to achieve a 
determined target (THIBAUT and KELLEY, 1959; EMERSON, 1962).  
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The power and resource distribution within a coalition were primarily approached by 
the literature (CAPLOV, 1956; 1968; GAMSON, 1961). However, in this study the coalition 
formation process was explored using two case studies – the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden 
focusing on the heating sector and the RenovaBio in Brazil. For that purpose, the typology of 
actors was utilized as framework, which is schematized in a pyramid blueprint presented in 




Figure 3.1. Pyramid blueprint of typology of actors for bilateral negotiations (elaborated from OLIVEIRA and 
ONUKI, 2015). 
 
The negotiating groups composing a coalition have a functional distribution more 
numerous and complex, although the dimensions and parameters contemplated by the typology 
of actors can be useful to determine the role of each actor within a coalition. In addition to that, 
numerous profiles can turn the decision-making process more complex, due to the quantity of 
variables to be considered (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015; CAENI, 2018). Furthermore, the 
bilateral negotiations composing two coalitions were taken in order to delimit this analysis.  
Taking into account the pyramid blueprint, the leader actors are placed on the top 
(leader, co-leader, anti-leader and guardian). In the medium base, the mediators, facilitators and 
brokers are situated. Finally, in the base of the pyramid, the medium-size and small size 
organizations comprise the leading actors within a coalition (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015; 




3.2.1 Leader  
 
 
“Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. 
And if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.” 
 (Friedrich Nietzsche) 
 
 
Within a coalition, the leader plays the most important role. It conducts the coalition 
towards a specific and determined objective. Accordingly, legitimacy, sense of direction, 
purpose and strategy are required (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015). 
 
 
3.2.2 Co-leader  
 
 
“Today we must abandon competition and secure cooperation. This must be the central fact 
in all our considerations of international affairs; otherwise we face certain disaster.” 
(Albert Einsten) 
 
Still on the top of the pyramid blueprint, the co-leader helps the leader in the leading 
process within a coalition. The role of the co-leader is to be a co-manager. In addition to that, 
the coalition can be divided into smaller groups, and the co-leader will help towards leading 






 Analogously to the co-leader, the guardian helps the leader in conducting the coalition.   
However, the guardian also has a protection role in relation to the leader position, protecting it 







“Don't be humble. You are not that great”  
(Golda Meir) 
 
The last profile in the pyramid blueprint is the anti-leader. This profile of policy actor 
disguisedly competes with the leader, within a coalition, due to diverse causes and motivations 






“It’s not what you give, it’s the way you give.” 
(Bruce Lee) 
 
Following the base of the pyramid, the mediator has the role to find reasonable positions 
among the coalitions (CAENI, 2018). The main mechanisms utilized by this intermediary actor 
are as follows: suggest a balanced proposal, be the communication vector among the parts, 
suggest solutions for stalemates – building a focal point to the agreement, among others. An 
important mediator characteristic is neutrality. The defense of their own interests or the biased 







The facilitators have a role similar to that of the mediators. However, the facilitators 
have a bureaucratic role whereas the mediators have a technical or political role. If these two 
actors extrapolate their roles, acting as interesting parties, they will lose their impartiality. Once 
this situation is noticed it will not be possible for these actors to continue developing their 
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positions, due to legitimacy issues. In addition to that, for the mediator and the facilitator the 






The broker plays the role to lobby the decision-making process, in favor of a specific 
group of interest or coalition, in accordance with previous and determined interests (OLIVEIRA 
and ONUKI, 2015). 
 
 
3.2.8 Medium-size and small organizations 
 
 
“A hundred times every day I remind myself that my inner and outer life are based on the 
labors of other men, living and dead, and that I must exert myself in order to give in the same 
measure as I have received and am still receiving…” 
(Albert Einsten) 
 
Finally, in the base of the pyramid, there are the medium-size and small organizations. 
Their roles are related to supporting the coalition despite being the weaker actors within a 
coalition (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015; CAENI, 2018).  
 
 
3.3 Leadership styles   
 
 




 Three main leadership styles were considered for this analysis – (i) instrumental, (ii) 
coercive and (iii) unilateral. The first one is based on the power of persuasion of the leader. The 
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second is underpinning threat scenarios. And the third one is based on the unilaterality of the 
leader - the decisions are made without using persuasion or threats, and even without interaction 
among the other parties involved (UNDERDAL, 1994).  
These three styles require different skills and capacities on the part of the leader within 
a coalition. The instrumental style is grounded on the consensus that requires an efficient 
communication capability on the part of the leader. Additionally, an efficient capability to 
diagnose situations, proposing efficient ways to tackle problems and elaborating mechanisms 
for overcoming stalemates, is also demanded (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015). 
Following the second case, a clear imbalance in power among the actors comprising a 
coalition is necessary for the application of the coercive style. This imbalance is taken from 
material sources (e.g. financial and military resources) or institutional prerogatives (e.g. 
relations between managers and staff). The imbalance in power is fundamental for this style 
because these elements make the inherent threats credible (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015). 
Finally, the unilateral style dismisses the threat by taking prompt actions, changing the 
course, even without prior notice to the other members of the coalition. When the unilateral 
leadership is applied it is not possible to consider that a negotiation process has occurred.  
Decision and the implementation are made unilaterally. Nevertheless, once a decision is made 
it is possible to open negotiations at another threshold (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015). 
The three styles are important for a leader because he or she should adopt the most 
appropriate style according to a given situation. Taking into account the instrumental style, it 
usually takes longer mainly because the use of dialogue and persuasion requires more time than 
threat and unilateral action. However, once the support is provided through persuasion, there is 
a tendency for a situation to have more stability. On the other hand, in some cases the leader 
might need to utilize sources to validate its leadership. Therefore, there is no one leadership 
style that is more important than another one (OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2015). 
 
 




The design of this study was a qualitative exploratory case study, which is a useful 
strategy to assess contemporary phenomena (YIN, 2017). In order to analyse the policy process 
that led to the planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the 
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Swedish heating sector, the typology of actors in bilateral negotiations was utilised in the form 
of conceptual lenses applied to a case study. The analysis is based on primary and secondary 
data sources - the case was analysed through documentary study and a qualitative analysis of 
full transcripts from interviews. The data supporting the analysis was collected from several 
sources as described below in depth. 
During the first stage, secondary data was utilized. Thus, the material related to the 
carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector was collected. Data from secondary 
sources embodied publicly available official documents related to the planning, formulation 
and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector and previous 
peer-review research related to this process. The identified peer-reviewed papers referred to 
were collected from DiVA, Scopus and Web of Science as the main databases. The Swedish 
Government databases contemplating documents and reports related to the planning, 
formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector 
encompassed the period between 1980 and 1991. 
In this initial stage, the materials connected to the dynamics of the interactions among 
the policy actors that eventually led to the planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector, offering insights into a coalition formation 
process were collected. In addition to that, material related to the background of the carbon 
dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector was also collected in this phase through the 
data referred to above in order to comprehend the driving forces that promoted the adoption of 
this energy policy in Sweden. The Swedish Government databases were important to identify 
the first initial policy actors connected to the analyzed case, especially the reports from the 
Swedish Parliament, the ECC reports and the official written communication regarding the 
carbon dioxide tax.  
In the second stage, there was the application of semi-structured interviews with open-
ended questions following a standard settled protocol (Appendix A). Preliminary names for the 
initial sample were identified through official documents and reports from the Swedish 
Parliament and the ECC. They were initially contacted by e-mails, social media vehicles15 and 
phone calls. Thus, preliminary interviews were conducted to evaluate the interview protocol 
and also to identify names of individuals that were not previously determined through 
secondary sources during the initial stage. Therefore, the snowball sampling16 was utilized to 
                                                
15 Some policy actors were contacted by the social media vehicles (e.g. linkedin and twitter). 
16 During the preliminary interviews, the interviewees were required to suggest other individuals to be included 
in the sample.  
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continue composing the sample, targeting those individuals involved in the planning, 
formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector.  
The great majority of the individuals contacted were willing to participate and 
contribute. The initial interviews were conducted with experts from the ECC and the Swedish 
Government in the preliminary stage. Afterwards, interviews with policy actors from the 
municipalities, DH sector, the forestry sector, NGOs, the industry sector, academia, and 
political parties were carried out. The total sample was formed by 15 individuals representing 
the policy actors within the interest groups. They contributed with fundamental information and 
insights about the policy process for the analyzed case.  
Their names were not allowed to be listed but their occupation is presented in Appendix 
B. Following the last stage, data from primary and secondary sources were triangulated and 
compared, focusing on the relations of the policy actors comprising the interest groups 
mentioned above. The outcome of these three phases was the profiles identification for the main 
policy actors forming the interest groups within the policy process related to the planning, 
formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating and also 
the driving forces thereof. Figure 3.2 summarizes the methodology process referred above. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Methodological approach for the Swedish case (elaborated by the author).  
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Regarding the interview protocol applied the semi-structured interview with open-ended 
questions following a standard established protocol (Appendix A) was composed by three main 
parties. On the first one, the main driving forces that led to the planning, formulation and 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector were explored. In 
the second part, the interviewees were inquired about the main actors’ roles having the 
functional distribution that builds a coalition as reference. They were asked about the leadership 
position, as well as the anti-leader, the guardian, the mediator, the broker, the medium-size and 
small organizations supporting the planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector. Furthermore, the leadership style was also 
approached in the second part.  
In the final part, the opposing movements related to the planning, formulation and 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector were investigated, 
following a similar structure applied in the second part of the semi-structured interview. The 
interviewees were inquired about the actors’ roles having the functional distribution of working 
on opposing movements for the tax adoption within a coalition. These structures provide the 
ground for reflections and insights on the general context of the policy process of the carbon 
dioxide tax focusing on the Swedish heating sector, and also on the target of this analysis. The 
interview structure utilized is provided in Appendix A. The interviews were transcribed and 
thematically coded using coding protocol17 (Appendix B). 
 
 
3.5 Research design for the case of RenovaBio in Brazil  
 
 
This study was also a qualitative exploratory case study. For purposes of analysing the 
policy process that led to the planning, formulation and adoption of RenovaBio in Brazil, the 
typology of actors in bilateral negotiations was utilized as framework. The analysis of 
RenovaBio is grounded on primary and secondary data sources. Therefore, the case was 
investigated through document study and a qualitative analysis of full transcripts from 
interviews that were conducted. 
                                                
17 Coding is a way utilized to categorize the text setting a structure of thematic ideas about it (GIBBS, 2007).  
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During the first phase, the material related to the Brazilian analysis was collected. Data 
from secondary sources included publicly available official documents linked to the policy 
process analyzed and previous peer-review research approaching this case. The referred 
identified peer-reviewed papers were collected from Scopus and Web of Science as databases. 
The Brazilian Government databases containing documents and reports approaching the policy 
process of RenovaBio cover the period between 2009 and 2017.  
Therefore, the materials linked to the dynamics of the interactions involving the actors 
that eventually guided the planning, formulation and adoption of the RenovaBio in Brazil, 
offering important insights into a coalition formation process were gathered. Furthermore, 
material related to the background of the program was also collected at this stage through the 
data previously referred to with the aim of grasping the driving forces that promoted the 
adoption of this program in Brazil. 
Following the second stage, the application of semi-structured interviews with open-
ended questions following a standard settled protocol (Appendix C) was conducted. The first 
names comprising the initial sample were identified through official documents from the 
Brazilian Government. They were initially contacted by e-mails and phone calls.  
Therefore, preliminary interviews were carried out to assess the interview protocol and 
to identify other names that were not identified through secondary sources in the initial phase. 
Afterwards, the snowball sampling was also utilized for the Brazilian analysis. Approximately 
half of the individuals contacted were willing to participate and contribute. The initial 
interviews began with academia in the preliminary stage. Subsequently, interviews with policy 
actors from the Brazilian Government took place. Subsequently, interviews with policy actors 
from public agencies, political parties, sugarcane industry and branch organizations, private 
sector and semi-public companies were also conducted.   
The total sample was formed by 18 individuals representing the policy actors within the 
interest groups. They contributed with relevant information and insights towards the policy 
process involving the Brazilian analysis. Academia and the ministries were the main 
contributors of this phase. Their occupation is presented in Appendix D, but their names were 
not allowed to be disclosed. Therefore, after the referred steps were taken, data from primary 
and secondary sources were triangulated and compared for this case. The results of these stages 
was the identification of the policy actors comprising the interest groups within the policy 
process related to the planning, formulation and adoption of the RenovaBio in Brazil, and also 
the driving forces connected to the process in question. Figure 3.3 sums up the methodology 




Figure 3.3. Methodological approach for the Brazilian case (elaborated by the author).  
 
Taking into account the interview protocol, the semi-structured interview with open-
ended questions following a standard established protocol (Appendix C) was organized in three 
parts. The first one focused on the driving forces for the Brazilian case. The second one explored 
the profiles of the policy actors within a coalition. The interviewees were asked about the 
leadership position, as well as the other ones comprising the typology of actors within a 
coalition. The leadership style was also explored in this part.  
The final part followed a similar structure of the second part. However, the interviewees 
were questioned about the actors’ roles having the functional distribution working on the 
opposing movements of the program. This structure provides a base for reflections over the 
broad context of the RenovaBio’s policy process in Brazil, and also on the objective of this 
analysis. The interview structure used is provided in Appendix C. Finally, the coding protocol 





3.6 Brief analysis of transparency on public policy   
 
 
The transparency on public policies should make available the information related to 
the public policy for the citizens. This is important because they will count with more support 
when making choices over the outcomes related to these policies. In addition to that, a 
transparent public policy is considered as effective in cases when the public can act based on 
the available information provided by that policy. Thus, the transparency of a public policy is 
related with inputs, outputs and outcomes of the citizen decisions (BALL, 2009). 
The accountability is another aspect related to a transparent public policy (BALL, 
2009). Therefore, transparency on public policy is perceived as elements that provide 
information over the policy, a clear accountability, and the citizens in general are aware of their 
roles in relation to the implementation of the public policy (FINKELSTEIN, 2000). However, 
the manner in which to design a transparent public policy is not clear. Due to conflicting goals 
within a policy design, the promotion of transparency is complex. As an outcome, the degree 
of transparency can differ from one public policy to another, especially in situations involving 
different countries (BALL, 2009).  
The degree of transparency counts on transactional and informational costs, considering 
the administrative level. Therefore, the public policies that were designed on transparency 
should provide comprehensible, usable and quality information to the general public. In 
addition, the inputs, outputs and outcomes should be included in the information provided 
(BALL, 2009). In this study, these three referred elements have been considered for a brief 
analysis over transparency on public policy for both cases, having a regulating role on the 




4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 




4.1 Initial Considerations  
 
  
This chapter is divided into two general parts. The first one explores the results of the 
analysis whereas the second one addresses the discussions over the results. Following the 
results, the Swedish case is then presented and the first session of this case explores the driving 
forces converging to promote the carbon dioxide tax in the Swedish heating sector. It is 
followed by a section presenting the typology of actors in bilateral negotiations applied for the 
Swedish analysis. This section is divided into three subsections and the first one presents the 
initial movements towards introducing the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden within the heating 
sector. The second one explores the steps taken towards the coalition formation process and the 
final subsection deals with the leadership styles of the coalitions identified for the Swedish 
analysis. Subsequently, there is a section exploring the transparency analysis of this case. 
Following the results of the Brazilian analysis, the driving forces converging to promote 
RenovaBio in Brazil is explored in section 4.5. Then, the typology of actors in bilateral 
negotiations applied for the RenovaBio in Brazil is addressed under two subsections. The first 
subsection presents the initial movements towards RenovaBio in Brazil. The second subsection 
considers the movements towards the coalition formation process for the Brazilian case and the 
last one comprises the analysis of leadership styles. After that, an analysis of transparency of 
RenovaBio in Brazil is presented. Then, the second general part is propounded discussing the 
cases analyzed. This section is divided into three subsections and the first one includes a 
discussion over the driving forces for both analyzed cases. The second subsection considers an 
analysis over the coalitions identified also for both cases whereas the third one presents a 




4.2 Driving forces converging to promote the carbon dioxide tax in the Swedish heating 
sector 
 
Based on interviews, driving forces on environmental and a political-economical 
driving levels led to the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden. The raising 
environmental public awareness and the interest of the Swedish Government in supporting 
bioenergy development were identified as the main driving forces in this process. The rise in 
environmental public awareness by society promoted a political debate on energy policy in the 
1980s. Thus, the Government gradually started to include environmental ideas in new laws and 
regulations. In the 1990s, the discussion on environmental awareness became stronger pushing 
the public bodies to develop policies in this field. Therefore, the carbon dioxide tax was one of 
the initiatives behind this societal demand. 
Furthermore, the Swedish Government had been making huge efforts on supporting 
bioenergy development since the 1980s. The solid fuel regulation and the wood fiber law were 
developed for such purposes before the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax. Pursuant to the first 
one, new boilers for heating had to be prepared for cogeneration and solid biofuels. The 
intention was to increase biomass use, however, a huge amount of coal was introduced in the 
system instead of that. By the second one, the flow of forest fiber was regulated for the 
traditional industry but the use for bioenergy was restricted. In view of that, the adoption of the 
carbon dioxide tax represented a new opportunity to support the use of bioenergy.  
 
 
4.3 The typology of actors in bilateral negotiations applied for the carbon dioxide tax 
within the Swedish heating sector 
 
 




The creation of the ECC was identified as a first step towards the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden within the heating sector. This Commission was composed of several 
interest groups including the government, political parties, municipalities and NGOs, among 
others. Initially, not all members were in favor of the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax even 
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though the great majority endorsed the tax. In addition to that, for most interviewees the ECC 
had a leadership position regarding the coalition that supported the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden.  
The Ministries of Finance, Enterprise and Environment were also supporters of the 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden. When the initial issues contrary to the 
introduction of the tax were raised the Ministry of Finance reinforced the need to adopt it by 
supporting and protecting the ECC. Considering a broader context, the creation of the carbon 
dioxide tax occurred concurrently with the negotiations of the major tax reform. Moreover, a 
reduction of income tax was a fundamental societal demand and the Ministry of Finance was 
searching for ways to promote that as well. Thus, the Ministry supported the adoption of the 
carbon dioxide tax because it also represented new profits from other sources which would 
balance the state budget. 
Within parliament, according to the majority of interviewees the Swedish 
parliamentarians also expressed relative support on adopting the tax. Furthermore, the 
perception of the politicians was changing following new trends by which the environmental 
driver should be included by their policies. Taking into account the political parties, the Green 
and Centre contributed towards the planning, formulation and adoption of the tax. The first one 
expressed its preference for wind and solar energy instead of bioenergy. However, since 
bioenergy was an alternative for fossil fuels the Greens supported it. In turn, the Centre Party 
shared values with the farming sector, municipalities and the countryside to a greater extent.  
The municipalities and the DH sector endorsed the planning of a carbon dioxide tax, 
being active at local discussions and committees with the aim of implementing it especially 
because the biomass market was also interesting for them. Besides that, the energy structure 
was different after the 1980s. Previously, from 1930 to 1980 there was a central planning 
composed by the Swedish Government, Vattenfall18 and the General Swedish Electric 
Company (ASEA)19 at one side and the municipalities at the other. Since the 1930s, these 
centers had been working independently due to their different views. Taking into account the 
general context at that time, the main political party considered utilities as part of the basic 
needs for the population. Following this idea, taxes were decreased in general especially for the 
industry sector. However, the tariffs on utilities were not substantially decreased for the 
                                                
18 Vattenfall was an important Swedish power company responsible for technology and distributional system in 
the 1980s (IAEA, 2009).  
19 Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget (ASEA) was an important Swedish company in the energy field in 
the 1980s (ABB, 2017). 	
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municipalities. Accordingly, the municipalities started to build their own electricity generation 
structure based on DH on a small scale. 
Since the 1960s they supported the expansion and diversification of the DH system even 
though it started to be developed prior to this decade. Additionally, the municipalities were the 
owners of heating companies having their own political will to use local fuels in order to boost 
the local economy. The transition from oil burners towards non-fossil fuels within the DH sector 
started at the end of the 1970s due to the oil crises. Before the adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax, this sector was already aware of the possibility of using solid bioenergy instead of oil. 
Therefore, the DH sector also endorsed the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax.  
After the adoption of it, the technical issues related to biomass use were solved by 
Research, Development and Innovation (RD&I) programs at the Thermal Engineering 
Research Association among other centers. Therefore, the carbon dioxide tax did not directly 
affect the DH development although the implementation of the tax increased the speed for 
switching the fossil fuel heating system to renewable energy heating. In the 1980s the central 
planning gradually started to change to a free economy and this tendency followed in Europe. 
The planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax was also part of this trend. It 
was also important to reduce the conflicts between municipalities and the central planning in a 
period during which Sweden and Europe were changing.  
One last important aspect is related to the importance of the public opinion for the 
Swedish case. According to all of interviewees, for the great majority of the Swedish population 
there was no need to implement new taxes in a country that already had a high tax burden. 
Furthermore, a newspaper article written by Astrid Lindgren20 triggered a broad discussion over 
the existing high levels of income tax. This factor influenced the elections and the Swedish 
Government started to plan a reform of the century by meeting a new societal demand - decrease 
the income tax.  
However, there was also an urgency to raise environmental awareness among society, 
at that time. According to the majority of interviewees, the discussions over the formulation 
and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax were strongly anchored on the environmental support 
that could be promoted through it. Therefore, the general public opinion supported the adoption 
of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden. In spite of strong opposition to a new tax, the respective 
motivation was highly connected to environmental issues. For a long time, Swedish society had 
been pushing the government to include the environmental awareness issue in its policies.  
                                                
20 Astrid Lindgreen was an important Swedish writer (ASTRIDLINDGREN, 2019).  
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4.3.3 Movements towards the coalition formation process   
 
 
Within the forestry sector, the forest owners, the sawmill industry, the smaller industries 
composing the forestry sector and the related branch associations were actively endorsing the 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax. The pulp and paper industry was the only policy actor 
strongly opposing the adoption of the tax within this sector. Regarding the branch associations, 
SVEBIO held discussions with important policy actors composing the interest groups in order 
to gain more support. After that, forest equipment manufacturers started to endorse the adoption 
of the carbon dioxide tax. These policy actors were interested in the creation of a biomass 
market that would solve the issue of the forestry residues thus generating extra income.   
 The biomass market was also interesting for the agriculture sector as well as the 
emerging bioenergy sector and they were also in favor of the adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax. Moreover, the Centre Party and the LRF supported the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax 
and pressed the Swedish Government to grant benefits on bioenergy production. Besides them, 
academia in general, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Svenska 
Naturskyddsföreningen - SNF) and EPA also endorsed the implementation of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden. 
On the other hand, the pulp and paper industry was strongly against the adoption of the 
tax. They expressed concerns over higher costs and competitiveness over forest resources. 
Furthermore, the pulp and paper industry operated on a similar oligopoly based structure, 
controlling the market prices of forest resources in Sweden. Apart from that, a free biomass 
market did not seem an interesting option. Indeed, they were engaged against the adoption of 
the carbon dioxide tax in different ways, that is, by adopting different strategies and holding a 
powerful and organized lobby at the parliament. Besides the direct influence over Swedish 
parliamentarians, the referred industry actors created stalemates in order to delay the 
negotiation process at both local and national committees. The branch associations also helped 
them in this process. According to the majority of interviewees, the pulp and paper industry 
was the leader of the coalition against the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden. 
Considering the branch associations, the Swedish Forest Industries Federation 
(Skogsindustrierna) also lobbied the Parliament to refuse the adoption of the tax. The industrial 
sector and the related branch associations were also against the adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax. As far as the branch associations are concerned, the Federation of Swedish Industries 
(Svenska Industriefoerbundet - SI), the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
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(Landsorganisationen i Sverige - LO), the Swedish Energy Intensive Industry (Skogen, Kemin, 
Gruvorna och Stålet - SKGS) and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt näringsliv) 
were very active at exerting political pressure over parliament with the aim of declining the 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax.    
For these policy actors, the carbon dioxide tax would harm industry competitiveness as 
a result of higher production costs. Furthermore, the industry sector was engaged in obtaining 
total exemption of the carbon dioxide tax as the rise in production costs was a major concern. 
In addition, the initiative to adopt the carbon dioxide tax at an early stage could burden Sweden 
with an unnecessary responsibility of solving climate issues. For the pulp and paper industry, 
the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax would generate a competition for forest biomass, 
especially fiber. Also, the incentive of biomass production for energy purposes through the 
collection of a new tax was considered unfair by this sector.  
The Moderate and Liberal Parties were also against the adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax primarily focusing on the industry sector interests, as they usually worked in Sweden. The 
Moderates worked towards trying to influence further interest groups against the adoption of 
the carbon dioxide tax. The Liberals protected the pulp and paper industry against unnecessary 
exposition, mainly at the Parliament. However, it was behind the curtains supporting the 
continuous opposition from the Liberals. Furthermore, the pulp and paper industry was closer 
to the industry sector than the other forestry industry sectors (sawmill industry sector, forest 
owners sector, among others) at that time. Consequently, the branch associations of the pulp 
and paper industry and the industry sector worked together, expressing a similar position 
regarding a new policy or tax as a whole.  
Therefore, the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax triggered diverging opinions 
especially within the forestry industry sector. However, the stalemates used by the pulp and 
paper industry sector for delaying the negotiations thereof slightly strained the other policy 
actors, not only within the forestry industry sector. Furthermore, the distance within this sector 
was even higher due to such actions. Afterwards, a traditional Swedish company at the forestry 
industry sector called Stora Kopparberg Bergslags Aktiebolag (STORA)21 started a long and 
complex discussion process with the pulp and paper industry. STORA worked for a reasonable 
outcome of the discussions over the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax, also promoting a 
relative unity within the sector. This company was searching for common bases within the 
forestry industry sector.  
                                                
21 Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag (STORA) and the Enso Oyj were two companies that merged in 
1998 forming Stora Enso (STORAENSO, 2018).  
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Thus, through a gradual process the direct resistance from the pulp and paper industry 
ceased. After that, the negotiation process could proceed towards the formulation and adoption 
of the carbon dioxide tax. Plus, the pulp and paper industry gradually considered that bioenergy 
would be part of its business. Regarding the divergences within parliament, the Social Democrat 
Party promoted a dialogue at both local and national levels. The party supported a hesitant 
balance between industry, economy and environment, comprehending the points involving the 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax but still endorsing exemptions for the industry.  
The Moderates changed their initial opposing position due to exemptions granted to the 
industry. The Liberals, alongside the Greens, were in favor of the replacement of the energy tax 
by the carbon dioxide tax. The Greens did not support the energy tax due to financial reasons 
(not environmental). The Liberals were also searching for ways to decrease the taxes for the 
industry. Despite of that, they finally considered the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax as 
reasonable for the Swedish society. Furthermore, it was important for the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax that the Green, Centre and Social Democrat parties had a higher influence at the 
parliament during that period. In the light of the foregoing, Figure 4.1 summarizes the outcomes 










4.3.4 Leadership styles  
 
 
According to all interviewees, the leaders used the instrumental style for both coalitions 
identified. It is also important to punctuate that the coalitions were well defined due to specific 
and clear interests since the beginning of the process that led to the planning, formulation and 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax focusing within the Swedish heating sector.  
 
 
4.4 Transparency analysis over the Swedish case 
 
 
 With regard to the issue concerning the carbon dioxide tax within the heating sector, the 
Swedish Government made information available related to the public policy for citizens. On 
the official webpage of the Swedish Government, the general public can have access to 
comprehensible, usable and quality information concerning the carbon dioxide tax. The 
majority of this information is written in Swedish but it is also possible to find useful and 
comprehensible information written in English. 
Articles and reports analyzing the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden, official presentations 
by the Swedish Ministry of Finance regarding the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden that were 
utilized at global conferences, events and interviews with employees in charge of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden are also on this webpage. In addition to that, statistics considering 
historical tax rates, tax revenues and energy use, among others, are also available on this 
website. This is important because clear communication is a fundamental aspect that supports 
a transparent public policy, as referred on Chapter 3.  
 Furthermore, the legal documents related to the carbon dioxide tax including committee 
terms of reference, government bill, written communication and the Swedish Government 
Official Reports (SOU series) are also available on the official webpage of the Swedish 
Government. The majority of that information is written in Swedish, although it is also possible 
to find some written communication in English. The reports and written communication from 
the ECC are written in Swedish. In general, recent public policies have more official 
information in English. However, because the formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax occurred in the 1990s the majority of the official information is available only in Swedish. 
Table 4.1 summarizes this analysis.  
 72 
 
Table 4.1. Transparency analysis of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden 
Criteria assessed  Comprehensible, usable and quality 
information 
 Swedish English  
Availability to consult the committee's reports22  Yes No 
Access to public hearing  Yes No 
Availability to consult the text of the bill Yes No 
Availability to consult the text of the law Yes  No 
Access to the voting of the law No  No  
Access to reports exploring the effects of the policy Yes  Yes  
Statistics approaching historical tax rates, tax revenues and energy use Yes  Yes  
General information, including official presentations about the carbon dioxide tax 
in Sweden  
No  Yes 
(elaborated by the author) 
 
 
4.5 Driving forces converging to promote RenovaBio in Brazil  
 
 
“Someday, somewhere - anywhere, unfailingly, you'll find yourself, and that, and only that, 
can be the happiest or bitterest hour of your life.” 
           (Pablo Neruda) 
 
Based on interviews, economic and economic-political driving forces led to the 
adoption of program RenovaBio in Brazil. A demand from the sugar-energy sector for actions 
supporting its sector and an interest expressed by part of MME’s employees at the Biofuel 
Department in actions endorsing the biofuel sector were identified as the main driving forces 
for the Brazilian analysis. The sugar-energy sector was working on the promotion of actions to 
support its sector due to a possible scrap of the installed hydrated alcohol structure. This 
concern was also shared by part of the Brazilian Government which also started to work on 
actions to endorse this sector. The interest expressed by part of the MME’s employees at the 




                                                
22 The committee’s reports are the State Public Reports in Sweden (Statens Offentliga Utredningar - SOU). 
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4.6 The typology of actors in bilateral negotiations applied for the RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
 
4.6.1 Initial movements towards RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
In 2016 Brazil ratified the Paris Agreement and the MME introduced changes within 
the Biofuel Department. The MME minister had changed the biofuel director and required a 
strategic plan to support the biofuel sector. The new biofuel director formed an initial working 
group within the Biofuel Department to develop the required program. It also counted on the 
support from the Bioethanol Science and Technology Center (Laboratório Nacional de Ciência 
e Tecnologia do Bioetanol - CTBE), the Agriculture Researches Brazilian Company (Empresa 
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - EMBRAPA) and academia in general to develop the 
program.  
Afterwards, it was submitted to the secretary of Bureau of Oil and Gas who did not 
approve of the program initially. Over a subsequent meeting, the initial opposition expressed 
by this secretary changed to resistance because the program would burden the oil sector. After 
that, the working group in charge to develop the program changed their strategy working on the 
identification of potential interest groups to support a new program to incentivize the biofuel 
production called RenovaBio. The initial interest groups identified were: (i) ethanol, (ii) 
biodiesel, (iii) biogas and (iv) bio-methane producers.  
Subsequently, the working group that was developing RenovaBio discussed the issue 
again during a third meeting with the Bureau of Oil and Gas, facing continuous opposition. 
Confronted with this scenario, the group started to build a strategy based on possible situations 
and simulations before the meetings. Additionally, the political articulation and lobby would 
be strengthened by the active participation of UNICA and the sugar-energy sector in the 
Southeast of the country. Some leaders of the sugar-energy sector23 from the Northeast of Brazil 






                                                
23 The sugar-energy sector produces sugar and ethanol, utilizing the same infrastructure. However, the ethanol 
producers within the biofuel sector produce only ethanol, and not sugar.  
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4.6.2 Movements towards the coalition formation process  
 
 
Subsequently the ethanol sector, UNICA and the sugar-energy sector, set up a mapping 
of the Congressmen that could support the adoption of the program. Therefore, the coalition 
towards RenovaBio’s adoption conquered more support within the National Congress, and a 
provisional measure was considered to speed the process. However, the market-leader of oil 
production, the oil derivative distribution market and the related branch associations were 
against the adoption of the program. The first one expressed a discordant position because the 
program would burden the oil sector, as previously mentioned. The second one preferred a tax 
differentiation option that would increase the price of the fossil fuels through taxation instead 
of the adoption of RenovaBio. Furthermore, the distribution market would also be burdened by 
the program because the increase in the use of ethanol (hydrated alcohol) would promote a 
lower total fuel cost thus decreasing the marginal gain of the distribution market. Therefore, the 
interest groups composing the fossil fuel chain in Brazil were not in favor of the transition 
towards renewables because it would drive profits away from them. 
Afterwards, the public hearing over the program occurred between February 15, 2017 
and March 03, 2017 (BRAZIL, 2017c). The policy actors who actively participated in this 
process were: the Brazilian Association of Industrial Biotechnology (Associação Brasileira de 
Biotecnologia Industrial - ABBI), the Brazilian Association of Biogas and Methane 
(Associação Brasileira de Biogás e Metano - ABBM), the Brazilian Association of Vegetal Oil 
Industries (Associação Brasileira da Induústria de Óleo Vegetal - ABIOVE), the Association 
of Biofuel Producers in Brazil (Associação dos Produtores de Biocombustível no Brasil - 
APROBIO) , the Brazilian Union of Biodiesel and Biokerosene (União Brasileira do biodiesel 
e bioquerosene - UBRABIO), the Association of Fuel Distributor (Associação das 
Distribuidoras de Combustíveis - BRASILCOM), the Federation of Sugarcane Planters in 
Brazil (Federação dos Plantadores de Cana-de-Açucar do Brasil - FEPLANA), the Sugarcane 
Industry Association (União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar - UNICA), some members of 
aeronautics in Brazil, the Platform of biokerosene and renewables from Minas Gerais 
(Plataforma Mineira de Bioquerosene e Renováveis), the Platform of Biokerosene from 
Pernambuco (Plataforma Pernambucana de Bioquerosene) and Petrobras (BRAZIL, 2017c). 
These policy actors were also identified as key small and medium organizations supporting the 
program through interviews.  
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The RenovaBio working group continued working to identify supporters to the program. 
The Union of Bioenergy Producers (União Nacional da Bioenergia - UDOP), an important 
branch association of the sugar-energy sector and the National Association of Automotive 
Vehicle Manufacturers (Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores - 
ANFAVEA) began to approve of the program. Nevertheless, the market-leader of the oil 
derivative distribution market and the related branch association promoted an efficient 
movement against the program articulating it within the Civil House, which was also against 
the program, alongside the Ministry of Planning. Afterwards, between July and August 2017 
the RenovaBio working group mobilized efforts on a provisional measure that would speedily 
block it within the Civil House. This fact represented a favorable outcome deriving from the 
efficient articulation power of the market-leader of the oil derivative distribution market at the 
Civil House. 
Still with regard to the opposing policy actors forming a coalition against the adoption 
of the program, the oil market-leader in Brazil presented a report as a contribution to the 
RenovaBio public hearing. The renewable energy as a national priority in Brazil was questioned 
through this report. Subsequently, this policy actor strongly tried to publicly change its position. 
According to some interviewees, this report expressed the position from only a few employees. 
However, for most interviewees the report represented the actual position of the majority of the 
employees. 
The Ministry of Finance was also strongly against RenovaBio as it was influenced by 
the oil derivative distribution market and oil market-leader due the effects from the RenovaBio 
mainly in view of a possible reduction in the tax collection related to higher prices of biofuels. 
Indeed, this Ministry also protected the oil market-leader against unnecessary exposition. 
According to half of the interviewees, the Ministry of Finance was empowered with information 
from representatives of the oil derivative distribution market and oil market-leader against the 
adoption of the program. It promoted an effective (and clear) opposing movement to RenovaBio 
at several official meetings. 
The channels of mass communication were broadly utilized by both coalitions that were 
already formed at that time. The supporting coalition used to prepare briefings to be published 
by a newspaper from the sugar-energy sector called NovaCana. The opposing coalition made 
attempts to influence the public opinion in Brazil against the program through a large-
circulation newspaper called Folha de São Paulo24.  
                                                
24 Folha de São Paulo is one of the major large-circulation newspapers in Brazil, edited in the city of São Paulo 
(FOLHA, 2017).  
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Besides the use of mass communication, social media vehicles were also utilized by the 
pro-RenovaBio coalition. A market intelligence agent joined the working group in charge of 
developing RenovaBio, and a group in a social media called WhatsApp formed by the majority 
of the interest groups that would be affected by the program (e.g. employees of the MME, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment, the sugar-energy sector, the biofuel sector, 
academia, the oil market-leader and the oil derivative distribution market among others) was 
created. This group held strategic information on the program in order to influence its 
components thereof.   
Following bureaucratic procedures and since the provisional measure was blocked, a 
draft bill would be the next step. Due to the articulation manifested in Congress by the 
supporting coalition, the period between filing the draft bill at the commission and the 
respective approval was 23 days. Besides that, the outcome of a dialogue between the Minister 
of Cities and the President to the Chamber of Deputies addressed the passing of the bill in 
question as a matter of urgency by the Chamber of Deputies.  
Subsequently, these two policy actors also promoted a dialogue with the Ministry of 
Planning and the Civil House members because they expressed an opposing view on the 
adoption of the program. Furthermore, the representative of the civil society at the CNPE 
promoted a dialogue among the interest groups formed by several policy actors that were 
involved with the formulation and adoption of the program in order to reach a reasonable 
outcome for them all. Finally, a deputy from the Green Party also worked in terms of promoting 
a dialogue between the coalitions as well as helping with the bureaucratic process inherent to 
the program.  
What is more, many Congressmen that were biofuel producers helped with the political 
articulation process as the support to the bioenergy sector was a matter of personal interest to 
them. At that time, the Ministry of Agriculture also joined the supporting coalition by helping 
the RenovaBio working groups conduct the process towards the adoption of the program. 
As referred to Chapter 2, the outcome of the voting at the Chamber of Deputies was 299 
votes in favor and 9 votes against RenovaBio. PSOL and the REDE were against RenovaBio 
based on the argument that the consequences of the program for the environment were not clear 
to these parties. As they were not fully aware of the impacts of RenovaBio they refrained from 
supporting it. According to the majority of interviewees, these two parties worked together 
within the National Congress in Brazil in an attempt to find opponents that would decline the 
adoption of the program. 
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 Another interesting fact that occurred between the voting at the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Federal Senate was a government agency linked to the MME deciding to increase their 
participation in the program. Afterwards, this agency also decided that the program should be 
considered its own creation because they were interested in gaining political prestigious. The 
same trend was considered by a federal government agency linked to the MME for the same 
reason. Accordingly, RenovaBio working group decided to accept the participation of these two 
agencies by letting them be in charge of explaining the technical elements of the program during 
official meetings. After a few meetings these two agencies reassessed their participation in the 
program.   
Following the pro-RenovaBio coalition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to 
support the program after a meeting held with the RenovaBio working group at which both a 
national and an international agenda towards renewable biofuels were blended. The RenovaBio 
comprised the former whereas the Bio-future Platform25 represented the latter. Nevertheless, 
the Bureau of Oil and Gas tried to prevent this meeting from taking place. As for the Ministry 
of Environment, its position was not clear due to some existing conflicts with the Ministry of 
Finance. This Ministry had an idea to implement a carbon dioxide tax in order to increase the 
collection of taxes. As a result, the Ministry of Finance effectively worked towards postponing 
the vote of the bill at the Federal Senate many times.  
Despite the above mentioned, the voting took place at the Federal Senate and the draft 
bill was approved by the great majority of the Senate. According to the majority of interviewees, 
the opposing coalition was astonished with the outcome. Therefore, two possible scenarios were 
considered – the first one has a more dynamic approach in relation to the pro-RenovaBio 
coalition. The RenovaBio working group formulated and developed an efficient program also 
focusing on political articulation in order to obtain approval. In this scenario, the opposing 
coalition was also politically articulated and despite the support from only a few members it 
was very powerful. However, it was not fast enough to form decision-making chains. The 
articulation structure and the decision-making process for this coalition were slower in 
comparison with the pro-RenovaBio coalition. 
For the interviewees that supported this first scenario, when the bill was approved at the 
Federal Senate, the opposing coalition still embraced the movements with the aim of blocking 
the provisional measure. Also taking into consideration the fact that the opposing coalition 
                                                
25 Following the Paris Agreement, the Biofuture Platform is an initiative representing joint efforts to speed up the 
development and implementation of advanced biofuels, in diverse sectors, as sustainable alternatives to fossil 
fuels, involving many countries, such as Brazil, France and Denmark (BIOFUTURE PLATFORM, 2018).  
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comprised powerful policy actors, they still refused to believe that a draft bill would be 
approved without their endorsement. Following the other scenario referred to above – a power 
vacuum was verified and RenovaBio was then approved because Congress was not entirely 
aware of the program. For a small portion of interviewees, the political situation of the country 
faced a lack of political leadership at the time. The National Congress was concerned with other 
types of issues and the deputy who worked on the bureaucratic process related to the program 
expressed a relatively neutral position. Therefore, these elements contributed to a favorable 





Figure 4.2. Coalitions identified for the Brazilian case (elaborated by the author). 
 
 
4.6.3 Leadership styles 
 
 
According to the conducted interviews, the leadership position for the pro-RenovaBio 
coalition adopted the instrumental style. The leadership position for the contra-RenovaBio 
coalition used a combination of instrumental and unilateral styles. As concerns the unilateral 
style, the report referred to above was an isolated action taken by the leader without any prior 
consultation with the other actors forming that coalition.  
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4.7 Brief analysis over the transparency of RenovaBio in Brazil  
 
 
Taking into account the case of RenovaBio in Brazil, the Brazilian Government made 
available the information connected to this public policy for the citizens. On the official 
webpage of the Brazilian Government linked to the RenovaBio it is possible to find 
comprehensible, usable and quality information available to the general public. Also, the legal 
documents related to RenovaBio and public hearing reports, the draft bill and official written 
communication related to the program are also available on this web page in Portuguese. 
However, the documents regarding the provisional measure that was declined were not 
available on this web page. Table 4.2 summarizes this analysis.       
 
Table 4.2. Transparency analysis over the RenovaBio in Brazil  
Criteria assessed  Comprehensible, usable and quality 
information 
 Portuguese English  
Availability to consult the committee's reports Yes No 
Access to public hearing Yes No 
Availability to consult the text of bill Yes No 
Availability to find information on the provisional measure No No 
Availability to consult the text of the provisional measure No No 
Availability to consult the text of the law Yes  No 
Access to the voting of the law at the Chamber of Deputies Yes  No  
Access to the voting of the law at the Federal Senate No No 
Access to reports exploring the potential effects of the policy Yes  No 
Statistics approaching historical tax rates, tax revenues and energy use Yes No 
General information, including official presentations about RenovaBio in Brazil  Yes  No 
(elaborated by the author) 
 
 
4.8 Discussion of cases 
 
 
4.8.1 Driving forces identified for the Swedish and the Brazilian cases  
 
 
 According to the literature, the targets for creating the carbon dioxide tax were based 
on the motivation towards technological innovation and the reduction of fuel consumption as 
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well as CO2 emissions as explored in Chapter 2. However, the motivation to create the tax were 
not explored through literature. According to the results, the driving forces leading to the 
adoption of the tax were the raising of public environmental awareness and the interest of the 
Swedish Government in supporting bioenergy development. At that time, the atmosphere was 
driven by a tough resistance against adopting new taxes, a considerable demand to reduce the 
marginal income tax and an urgency of environmental awareness among society as a whole. 
Thus, this last element was considered by the Swedish Government for creating a new 
environmental tax at an appropriate time. Therefore, the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax was 
a clever way of implementing a new tax and increasing the state budget (reduced by the changes 
to the marginal income tax) for purposes of environmental awareness.  
Following the Brazilian analysis and according to the literature, RenovaBio was created 
with the aim of identifying the strategic role played by biofuels in Brazil taking into account 
energy security issues. The mitigation of GHG emissions was also part of the scope of the 
program since it was born out of the compliance with the targets set forth by the Paris 
Agreement, as referred to in Chapter 2. However, according to the interviewees demands from 
the sugar-energy sector for actions supporting its own sector and the interest of part of MME’s 
Bioenergy Department employees in supporting the biofuel sector were identified as the main 
driving forces towards the adoption of the program. Therefore, RenovaBio was born through 
the compliance with the targets of the Paris Agreement although it would nevertheless have 
been created regardless of anything else due to increasing demands from the sugar-energy 
sector and part of the MME’s employees. 
In the light of the foregoing, as concerns the Swedish case environmental and political-
economical driving forces were identified. For the Brazilian case, economic and political-
economical driving forces were identified. Reconsidering the hypothesis for this study, the 
raising public environmental awareness among Swedish society was the only driving force 
identified that could have been related to the environmental agenda when implementing energy 
policies. However, this driving force became stronger when joined by the interest of the 
Swedish Government in supporting bioenergy use. Indeed, the rise in public environmental 
awareness was already present among Swedish society before the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax. It strengthened the interest of the Swedish Government to support bioenergy use 
although it was not enough on its own to implement an energy policy. 
Regarding the Brazilian analysis, the environmental agenda was not identified as a 
driving force for the implementation of RenovaBio, according to the great majority of the 
interviewees. Instead, economic and political-economical driving forces were identified. 
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Despite the fact that the ratification of the Paris Agreement created a demand for different 
public policies focusing on the environmental agenda, RenovaBio was the outcome of a demand 
for sugar-energy sector supported by part of the Brazilian Government. Therefore, the 
environmental agenda was not considered the main driving force for neither developed nor 
developing countries when it comes to implementing energy policies. For both analysis, other 
agendas were considered more important other than environmental agenda.    
 
 
4.8.2 Analysis of the coalitions identified  
 
 
According to the literature, the planning of the carbon dioxide tax was a gradual process 
involving many interest groups within Swedish society. The global warming discussions and 
related issues emerged in the 1980s and the environmental and business groups pushed the 
Swedish Government towards taking actions to tackle the problem. The great majority of the 
interviews showed a similar perspective on this process. In addition to that and according to the 
literature and the results thereof, the ECC was the first step towards the planning of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden targeting the heating and transportation sectors as well as involving many 
interest groups throughout society. Furthermore, these interest groups remained at their initial 
position along the process of planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in 
Sweden, according to the results obtained. 
Based on the analysis of RenovaBio in Brazil, it was launched by the MME at the end 
of 2016 and discussions over the program were held among the productive sector and the 
Brazilian Government in order to settle the objectives and guidelines thereof. Subsequently, the 
proposal was drawn up and the period for public hearing began. The CNPE agreed on the 
strategic guidelines for the program and also deliberated about the RenovaBio working group 
as referred to in Chapter 2. Following the results, RenovaBio was born out of a demand from 
the new MME minister for creating a plan to support the biofuel sector. Thus, the MME minister 
replaced the director of the Biofuel Department and a working group to develop this program 
was formed by this new director. Therefore, the planning process of this program involved a 
few interest groups from the Brazilian society. 
Reconsidering the Swedish analysis and according to the literature, the environmental 
groups supported the adoption of a carbon dioxide tax in Sweden alongside the Centre and Left 
parties. Moreover, the Centre Party and some branch organizations were searching for benefits 
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from bioenergy production. Besides that and according to the interviewees among the industry 
sector, the interest groups that supported the planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax within the heating market (e.g. the sawmill industry sector) were interested in the 
creation of a biomass market. On the other hand, the industrial sector and the branch 
associations thereof were against the formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in 
Sweden within the heating sector due to concerns over higher costs, as per the literature. 
Accordingly, the pulp and paper industry was identified as the leader of the opposing coalition 
holding a strong lobby at the Parliament, according to interviewees. This industry was against 
the carbon dioxide tax because it would trigger the creation of a biomass market. Since it had 
no involvement with bioenergy producers the biomass market was not an appealing option. 
Additionally, the opposing coalition was well organized and structured. The dialogue 
among its members was effective and all of them had the declared support from the pulp and 
paper industry, according to the results. The impacts over the production costs for the industry 
sector resulting from the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax was the main concern for the 
opposing coalition. At that time, this sector had no concerns over environmental issues that 
could be associated to its public image. Therefore, within the forestry industry sector, the 
supporters and opponents of the creation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax on the heating 
sector were primarily focused on market issues.  
A similar process was considered for the Brazilian analysis. According to the results 
thereof, the interest groups within the fuel sector that supported the formulation and adoption 
of RenovaBio were interested in actions that would support the market of biofuel sector. And 
the interest groups within this sector that did not approve of this process were not interested in 
actions aimed at backing up the biofuel market. The identified leader of the opposing coalition 
was the oil market leader in Brazil. Analogously to the Swedish case, this policy actor also held 
strong lobby at the Brazilian Government according to the majority of interviewees, but not 
according to the literature.   
Nevertheless, the opposing coalition in Brazil was facing some organizational issues. 
Firstly, the leader was not inclined to take up its position due to concerns over public image. 
Consequently, the guardian was mistakenly taken as the leader of the opposing movements for 
many times when protecting the actual leader from exposure. Secondly, the lack of dialogue 
within this coalition was an evident issue. When the public hearing occurred, the contribution 
of the leader was a report through which the role of renewable energy in Brazil was being 
questioned. According to the majority of interviewees, this action was an isolated one without 
prior consultation among the other members comprising the coalition in question.  
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However, if a previous dialogue with the other members had taken place this report 
would probably not have been submitted for public hearing especially because the broker would 
not allow this action to be taken. Subsequent to the public hearing, the RenovaBio working 
group worked on the preparation of a provisional measure with the aim of adopting the program. 
Due to an efficient articulation promoted by the leader of the oil derivative distribution market 
(broker) within the Civil House, the provisional measure was blocked. The broker worked 
alongside the guardian – the Minister of Finance who was against the program due to a potential 
decrease in tax collection that would be impacted as a result of adopting the program. The same 
argument in an opposite direction was used to influence the Ministry of Finance in Sweden 
since a growing state budget was a potential effect from the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax 
within the Swedish heating sector. As a result, the Minister of Finance ended up supporting the 
formulation and adoption of this policy.      
Other important policy actors linked to the Swedish case were the Social Democrat Party 
and STORA. The mediator and the facilitator have a substantial importance for the Swedish 
culture because consensus is considered an important value as referred to in Chapter 2. The 
negotiations over the formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden would not 
have been carried out without at least a partial approval from the interest groups involved. After 
that, the bill would be sent to the parliament who would then decide to implement the carbon 
dioxide tax by law.  
 Reconsidering the Brazilian case, the broker was more important in comparison with 
the mediator and the facilitator in the Swedish analysis. However, the facilitators were 
important for speeding up the bureaucratic procedures on the power spheres in Brazil. 
Following the adoption of RenovaBio, the bill was voted at the Chamber of Deputies and 
subsequently at the Federal Senate which was approved with a large majority. According to the 
literature, there is a tendency to promote lobbying at the Executive branch when legislative 
procedures are taking place in Brazil. However, according to interviewees the political lobbying 
occurred during the entire process for adopting the program.  
Indeed, the planning of RenovaBio was also influenced by the political lobbying within 
the bioenergy sector having efficient policy actors to promote this activity such as UNICA. On 
the other hand, the opposing coalition also promoted heavy lobby making the process even 
more complex. Taking into account half of the interviewees, the oil market leader in Brazil and 
the oil derivative distributing sector held a more powerful lobby than that of bioenergy although 
this information was not found in the literature. Furthermore, according to the literature, the 
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bioenergy sector and the related branch associations count on strong and organized lobbying 
activities in Brazil.  
In Sweden, a relatively similar situation happened - the carbon dioxide tax was adopted 
despite strong lobby against it by powerful policy actors. According to the literature and the 
results, the pulp and paper industry and related branch associations held a political influence at 
that time. Plus, the branch associations within the bioenergy sector were also relatively active 
as far as lobbying goes, as per the literature. However, prior to the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden, these organizations were already conquering their space since the 
bioenergy sector was an emerging sector at that period. Therefore, for both cases analyzed in 
Sweden and Brazil, the opposing lobby from important interest groups were against the energy 
policies implemented, according to the results.  
In addition, probably the fact that the Swedish Government and part of the Brazilian 
Government had a relevant interest in adopting these policies was important for both cases. 
Following the referred analysis and taking into account the position from the leader of the 
opposing coalition against RenovaBio in Brazil, perhaps the time at which it took place could 
be considered. As market issues were primarily the focus instead of environmental issues the 
scenario thereof was considerably complex even for a developing country at the current time. 
Due to global efforts towards tackling the consequences of climate change, such position could 
indeed damage the public image of a policy actor.  
As previously mentioned, market issues were strongly influencing elements for both 
cases. According to the Swedish analysis, not only the forestry industry sector but also the 
majority of the interest groups composing the coalition that supported the adoption of the 
carbon dioxide were interested in the creation of a biomass market. The majority of the interest 
groups forming the opposing coalition was not interested in the creation of a biomass market 
due to concerns over competitiveness. The other components were concerned about the higher 
costs impacting their business. 
For the Brazilian case, the majority of the interest groups composing the coalition in 
favor of RenovaBio was interested in the empowering biofuels production. Likewise, the 
majority of the interest groups forming the opposing coalition had no interest in the instruments 
for supporting the biofuel sector due to competitive concerns. Therefore, market issues could 
be regarded as a key element for the endorsement or opposition expressed by the majority of 
the interest groups forming the coalitions for a developed as well as a developing country.  
 There were exceptions involving the academia, NGOs and some political parties based 
on ideological positions and other factors besides market issues. However, these interest groups 
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had a lesser importance within the coalitions. One final aspect of this analysis in which a 
substantial difference between Sweden and Brazil is considered relates to the importance of 
public opinion. According to the literature, the public opinion in Sweden pushed the 
government to include an environmental agenda in its policies. At that time, the adoption of the 
carbon dioxide tax was influenced by this trend and the perspective of having a carbon dioxide 
tax was perceived as acceptable by the majority of the citizenships in Sweden. In addition to 
that and according to the results thereof, the public opinion support was fundamental for the 
implementation of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden. The general context was complicated for 
the creation of new taxes in Sweden even though the carbon dioxide tax involved an 
environmental dimension that was supported by society in general.  
Following the Brazilian analysis, the literature studies did not identify the importance 
of the public opinion for the implementation of RenovaBio. Furthermore, according to the 
results the public opinion was not vital in this process. Therefore, if the importance of market 
issues was a convergent element to this analysis, the relevance of public opinion would be a 
divergent element too. Not to mention the broadly participation of society in the decision-
making process, as previously referred to.  
The policy process of the Swedish analysis involved different policy actors that 
comprised the interest groups throughout this process on a continuous basis whereas the policy 
process of the Brazilian analysis was not characterized by several policy actors forming the 
interest groups throughout a gradual process in which society held a participation. Perhaps the 
public opinion could have had some impact due to the channels of mass communication that 
were utilized by both coalitions in order to influence the citizens in Brazil.  
 
 
4.8.3 Discussions over transparency 
 
 
The Swedish Government made available a relevant amount of comprehensible, usable 
and quality information related to the planning, formulation and adoption of the carbon dioxide 
tax for the Swedish population. The legal documents supporting the process are also available 
in Swedish. However, it is possible to find a substantial amount of reports and official 
presentations in English on the official webpage of the Swedish Government.  
Taking into account the Brazilian analysis, the Brazilian Government made available a 
significant amount of comprehensible, usable and quality information related to the planning, 
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formulation and adoption of RenovaBio for the population. The legal documents supporting the 
process are also available in Portuguese. However, there are no information available in 
English. Additionally, the official documents linked to the declined provisional measure were 







“Everyone has inside of him a piece of good news. The good news is that you don’t know how 





5.1 Initial Considerations  
  
 
The conclusion of this thesis is presented herein. From the first steps towards the 
planning of the carbon dioxide tax, through the formulation process up to the respective 
adoption, this analysis lasted a rich period of 11 years and approached several interest groups 
within the Swedish heating sector. Following the Brazilian analysis, a similar process has been 
considered. From the first steps towards the planning of RenovaBio, right through the 
formulation process up to the respective adoption, this analysis lasted a complex period and 
approached several interest groups related to the Brazilian bioenergy sector. The conclusion 
encompasses the research question and the objectives previously described under the 
introduction. Thereafter, further studies have been presented. 
 
 
5.2 Conclusion  
  
 
The analysis showed the importance of the economical dimension within the driving 
forces, for both a developed and a developing country. For the earlier case, the environmental 
as well as the political-economical drivers were fundamental for the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax. For the subsequent case, an economical and a political-economical drivers worked 
together towards the adoption of a program that would support the bioenergy sector.       
Exploring the policy-making process, the reduction of GHG emissions and the need for 
policies to handle this matter have been under discussions among Swedish society since the 
1980s. Nevertheless, this movement became stronger in the 1990s. Then, the establishment of 
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the ECC was a way of including such issues in the policymaker agenda.  A continuous process 
resulted then involving the active participation of Swedish society. 
In Brazil, since 2009 the government has been making attempts to include an 
environmental agenda in its policies. Probably, the ratification of the Paris Agreement 
strengthened this process. Subsequently, RenovaBio was created due to a demand from the 
MME for creating a plan that would support the bioenergy sector based on the context of the 
Paris Agreement. Afterwards, the design of the program involved a few policy actors within 
the Brazilian society mainly connected to the sugar-energy sector.  
From the design of the carbon dioxide tax in Sweden to the adoption of the respective 
bill a synergic process was brought about. Through the understanding of the dynamics 
surrounding the interactions among the policy actors that led to the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax within the Swedish heating sector two coalitions were identified. The majority of 
the forestry industry sector and branch associations related to this sector, the Centre and Green 
Parties, the great majority of the government, NGOs, academia, municipalities, the DH sector, 
the agriculture sector and the emerging bioenergy sector supported the adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax in Sweden, focusing on the heating sector. 
On the other hand, the pulp and paper industry, the industry sector, the related branch 
associations of these two sectors and the Moderate and Liberal Parties were against the adoption 
of the carbon dioxide tax within the heating sector. This coalition was smaller but its leader was 
the pulp and paper industry which held powerful lobby at the Swedish Parliament. In view of 
this scenario, the mediator and the facilitator – STORA and the Social Democrat Party were 
fundamental in the mediation of reasonable discussions among coalitions. The coalitions were 
well organized and structured and their leadership approach was based on the power of 
persuasion from both sides. In addition to that, market issues were fundamental for both tax 
supporters and opponents. The former was interested in the creation of a biomass market in 
Sweden whereas the latter was against such procedure and this was also due to concerns over 
costs.      
Considering the Brazilian case, two coalitions were also identified. The supporting 
group mainly comprised the majority of the bioenergy sector (industrial, agricultural and 
regulatory segments) and the related branch associations, academia, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture. The opposing group was formed by the oil market-
leader in Brazil, the distributor segment within the bioenergy sector, the Ministries of Finance 
and Planning, the Civil House, the Bureau of Oil and Gas at MME, and some political parties - 
PSOL and REDE. Based on this analysis, the leader of the distributor segment - the broker had 
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a major importance before government and due to its actions a provisional measure to adopt 
the program was dropped. 
The supporting coalition was well structured whereas the opposing one presented some 
organization issues. There was a lack of dialogue among the latter and the leader could not 
assume its position because of concerns over public image. Perhaps that explains the use of an 
instrumental leadership through which actions are taken on an isolated basis by the leader. 
Indeed, it was complicated for a policy actor to express opposition to a program that would 
encourage the use of renewable energy, even if such program would burden its own segment, 
that is, the oil sector. 
However, the majority of the opposing coalition was against the program for the same 
reason – it would burden the oil sector. The great majority of the endorsing coalition was in 
favor of the program because giving support to the sugar-energy sector was interesting for them. 
Therefore, market issues were a key factor for the endorsement or opposition by the majority 
of the interest groups comprising the coalitions in both a developed and a developing country. 
Also for both analysis the opposing coalitions were smaller but comprised of powerful 
interest groups having economic influence and political lobby. Still, the carbon dioxide tax was 
adopted in Sweden and the RenovaBio in Brazil. Probably the interest in supporting the 
emerging bioenergy sector in Sweden by the Swedish Government and the interest in 
supporting the already established sugar-energy sector in Brazil by the Brazilian Government 
were key elements in this process.      
After exploring the converging elements for both the developed and developing cases 
analyzed, it worth mentioning that the carbon dioxide tax is a well-consolidated case of the 
analysis whereas RenovaBio still requires time to have the same status due to some bureaucratic 
procedures within the power spheres. The Swedish analysis disclosed the importance of public 
opinion when establishing a public policy in a developed country. It is worth bearing in mind 
that the public opinion in Sweden had already pushed the government to include an 
environmental agenda in its policies long before the adoption of the carbon dioxide tax in 1991.  
According to the Brazilian case, the public opinion was not considered a key factor for 
the whole policy-making process. Therefore, by analyzing this process regarding public 
policies in the energy field in both a developed and a developing country, the main difference 
lies in the importance attributed to the public opinion. Moreover, the broad participation of 
society throughout the decision-making process was another divergent factor. The Swedish 
carbon dioxide tax involved many policy actors composing the interest groups from planning 
to adoption, whereas RenovaBio in Brazil counted only on a few society members.   
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On the other hand, considering that this multidisciplinary thesis is a descriptive 
comparison between a developed country marked by a stable environmental agenda and a 
developing country in which many efforts still need to be considered in order to combine the 
environmental agenda with its own development affairs, the importance of market issues for 
both cases is an interesting aspect. The cases cannot present a rigorous comparative analysis 
since they are temporally, institutionally and contextually different. However, market issues 
were taken as the most important factors shared by the coalitions either in favour or against the 
energy policies analysed. As well as the importance of the economical dimension within the 
driving forces, other aspects have been discussed in this Chapter.   
As for transparency issues both cases counted on this element. However, the documents 
supporting the Brazilian analysis were available only in Portuguese whereas the documents 
supporting the Swedish case were available not only in Swedish but also in English. Therefore, 
the transparency verified was relatively higher for the Swedish case since the language used to 
write the documents is a critical issue. In addition to that, the documents of the provisional 
measure for the Brazilian case were not available.  
 
 
5.3 Further Studies  
 
 
For further studies the following can be considered:   
 
(i) Analysis of the policy-making process related to the Swedish carbon dioxide tax 
focusing on transportation using a rationalist method, such as the typology of 
actors that was used in this thesis;  
(ii) Analysis of the policy-making process related to the Swedish carbon dioxide tax 
focusing on transportation using a cognitive method, e.g. the Advocacy 
Coalitions Framework (ACF)  
(iii) Analysis of the policy-making process of RenovaBio using a cognitive method, 
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Appendix A: Interview protocol for the case of the carbon dioxide tax for the Swedish 
heating sector 
	
Information provided to the interviewee: this research focuses on the understanding of 
the policy process involving the carbon dioxide tax implementation in Sweden for the heating 
sector through the period of planning to the actual adoption. 
 
Driving forces converging to introduce the carbon dioxide tax within the Swedish heating 
sector  
 
1. The carbon dioxide tax was introduced in 1991. Why was it created and adopted?  




1. How was the negotiation process regarding the carbon dioxide tax within the 
Swedish heating sector held? Who were the most important actors in its planning, 
formulation and adoption? 
2. Did anyone take a leadership role? 
3. Who supported this leader by helping in the formulation and adoption of the carbon 
dioxide tax within the Swedish heating sector? 
4. Were there any actors who protected the leader against threats and aggressions?   
5. Was there anyone trying to compete with the leader? If so, why?  
6. Did anyone mediate negotiations, suggesting solutions for stalemates?  
7. Did anyone try to influence the decision-making process aiming at specific 
interests?           
8. Were there any important medium-size organizations involved in this process? 
9. Were there any important small-size organizations involved in this process? 
10. Regarding the leadership position, was the process based on efficient 
communication skills, persuasion or use of power, influence and resources? Or was 





Opposing movements  
 
1. Were there any opposing movements in relation to the planning, formulation and 
adoption of the carbon dioxide tax within the heating sector? If so, why?    
2. Is it possible to consider the same structure referred to above? If so, who was the 
leader, the anti-leader, the guardian, the mediator, the broker, the medium-size 
organizations and smaller organizations against the formulation and adoption of 









Appendix B: Interviews for the case involving the carbon dioxide tax within 
 the Swedish heating sector 
	
 
The table below presents the interviews conducted thereof. In order to preserve 
confidentiality, companies and the names of interviewees have not been revealed.    
 
Table 1: Organizations and interviews 
Type of organization Occupation of informants Number of interviews 
Government  Government employee 2 
Environmental Charge Commission (ECC) Expert 2 
Municipalities Municipality employee 1 
DH sector DH sector employee 1 
NGOs NGO employee  1 
Forestry Sector  CEO of forestry industry sector, 
employee of branch organizations 
4 
Energy Intensive Industry CEO 1 
Academia Professor 1 
Political Parties Politician and former minister 2 
 
Table 2: Personal Communication 
Personal Communication Number 
Government employee PC1 
Government employee PC2 
Expert PC3 
Expert PC4 
Municipality employee PC5 
DH sector employee PC6 
NGO employee PC7 
CEO of forestry industry sector PC8 
Branch organization PC9 
Branch organization PC10 
Branch organization PC11 
CEO of energy intensive industry PC12 
Professor PC13 
Politician PC14 











APPENDIX C: Interview protocol for the case of RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
Information provided to the interviewee: focuses on the understanding of the policy 
process involving the program RenovaBio in Brazil throughout the period from planning to 
adoption.  
 
Driving forces converging to promote RenovaBio in Brazil  
 
1. Why was RenovaBio formulated and adopted?  




1. How was the negotiation process regarding RenovaBio held? Who were the most 
important actors in its planning, formulation and adoption? 
2. Did anyone take a leadership role? 
3. Who supported this leader by helping in the formulation and adoption of the 
program?  
4. Were there any actors who protected the leader against threats and aggressions?  
5. Was there anyone trying to compete with the leader? If so, why?  
6. Did anyone mediate negotiations, suggesting solutions for stalemates?  
7. Did anyone try to influence the decision-making process aiming at specific 
interests?           
8. Were there any important medium-size organizations involved in this process? 
9. Were there any important small-size organizations involved in this process? 
10. Regarding the leadership position, was the process based on efficient 
communication skills, persuasion or use of power, influence and resources? Or was 
there a combination of all these situations?    
 
Opposing movements  
 
1. Were there opposing movements to the planning, formulation and adoption of 
RenovaBio? If so, why?    
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2. Is it possible to consider the same structure referred above? If so, who was the 
leader, the anti-leader, the guardian, the mediator, the broker, the medium-size and 
the small-size organizations against the formulation and adoption of RenovaBio?   
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APPENDIX D: Interviews for the case involving the program RenovaBio in Brazil 
 
The table presents presents the interviews conducted thereof. In order to preserve 
confidentiality, companies and the names of interviewees have not been revealed.    
   
Table 1: Organizations and interviews 
Type of organization Occupation of informants Number of interviews 
Government  Politician 1 
Ministries Civil servant 3 
Public agencies Employee 4 
Academia Professor, researcher 3 
Branch organization CEO, President 3 
Sugarcane Industry CEO 1 
Private sector CEO, advisor 2 
Semi-public companies Employee 1 
 
Table 2: Personal Communication 
Personal Communication Number 
Politician PC1 
Government employee PC2 
Government employee PC3   
Government employee PC4   
Civil servant PC5   
Civil servant PC6   
Civil servant PC7   
Civil servant PC8   
Professor PC9   
Professor PC10   
Researcher PC11   
CEO PC12   
Director PC13   
President PC14   
CEO PC15   











APPENDIX E: Conferences and workshops 
 
The table presents information on conferences and workshops relevant to the thesis. 
 
Conference / Workshop Date Place Researcher’s role 
X Brazilian Congress of Energy Planning  
 (XCBPE) 






24th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC (COP24) 

















Finance driving sustainability: exploring 






Sustainability and Circular Economies: 






UN talks: Investing in Core Governments 











Bio-economy pathways: Innovation, 
development and governance 
13 Jun. 
2019 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Participant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
